Оперинфсводка № Особого отдела Таджикской группы войск на 1 мая 1931 г.

Translation

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K.

6 copies Mash. OYu [?] File No._ Top secret

Provide to Troop Commander for review

4 May tS

Operational summary No._

From Special Department of the Tadzhikistan Group

as of 1 May 1931

Incoming No. 203/op

4 May 1931

D

Operational actions of the units.

On 25 April 1931 the Group Staff received information on the unification of the band of Ibragim Bek, Ali Mardan Datkho and other basmach chieftains with a strength of 500 men in the vicinity of the gorge 4 km. west of Peiz-Bulak with a possible move into the area of Ak-Mechet for the purpose of crossing to the right bank of the Kafirnigan River.

Based on this information, on the same day, 25 April 1931, at 2010 hours the Troop Commander ordered Brigade Commander 7: after consolidating the command of all the Brigade units participating in the operation, carry out a devastating strike against the bands by using a powerful group on the right flank to follow the Kafirnigan River through Ak-Mechet with the objective of preventing the bandit gangs from crossing the Kafirnigan River, etc. The units were ordered, in the event they discovered the bands, to engage and pursue them without awaiting instructions until their total annihilation.

In executing their operational task against the basmach gangs, the units that were sent south had the following clashes. A squadron of the Third Division, on the evening of 25 April, with a 200-man band at marker 819 (8 km. west of Peiz-Bulak). A squadron of the Uzbek Cavalry regiment and a squadron of the Third Division, on 27 April in the vicinity of Tash-Bulak (0.5 km. from elevation 819) had a battle resulting in the loss by the basmach gang of 25 killed, one taken prisoner and six horses captured.

The units of the Brigade did not completely fulfill their task, and the bands partially broke through to the west and partially to the northeast and to the south. Ali Mardan Datkho’s band, after splitting off from the main group, appeared on 28 April 5 kilometers west of Kyzyl-Kal. Through the energetic and skillful actions of the Tadzhik Cavalry Division under the command of Cde. Pozdniak, Ali Mardan Datkho’s band, numbering 75 dzhigits [skilled horsemen], was routed on 29 April in the Kasandak mountains (4 km. northwest of the settlement of Uialy), losing 11 dzhigits killed, six taken prisoner, nine rifles and six horses, after which it dispersed in small groups in various directions. A wounded Ali Mardan Datkho fled with 11 dzhigits into the Aryk-Tau mountains.

The reasons for the failure to fulfill the task stem from the Brigade Staff’s poor communications with the subdivisions of its units and poor leadership by the Staff. During the entire time of the operation the Brigade Staff was not in communication with the units and had almost no communication with the group’s staff, since aircraft were not operating due to rain, the radio stations that the Brigade’s units had at its disposal were not operating, and communications with heliographs was extremely hampered (rain, fog). In addition, a mounted patrol dispatched with an order from the Brigade Commander did not find the units and returned. Consequently, the Brigade command, in effect, did not guide the units.

The malfunctioning of the communications, according to the group’s communications chief, is attributable to the poor quality of the power supply and the lack of training of the radio operators, who at his request were trained on long-wave rather than short-wave stations. But there were also

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instances of another kind, when for example the radio set in the 79th Cavalry Regiment did not have batteries, and the one in the 80th Cavalry Regiment did not have headphones. The latter represents a disgraceful attitude toward the mission by the group’s communications workers, who failed to provide a power supply for the radio sets. In addition, at the request of the Radio Company Commander, short-wave radio sets were sent into the operation to test their potential use. All of the communications information will be clarified in order to conduct an investigation and hold the guilty parties to account.

At the height of the operation itself the right column, numbering 75 sabers, two heavy machineguns and one light machinegun under the commander of the Regiment School commander of the 80th Cavalry Regiment, Konstantinov, instead of moving on the right flank up to the left bank of the Kafirnagan River for the purpose of preventing a breakthrough by the bands to the right bank of the Kafirnagan, came out of Dagan into the road running from Dagan through Yabu to elevations 891, 851 and beyond. Upon discovering the enemy at the aforementioned elevation and engaging in a gun battle with him, it quickly returned to the settlement of Yabu “for foraging.” This was while all the units were driving back the enemy and surrounding it. Not until the next day did Konstantinov proceed along his route, but it was too late—the bands had broken through and escaped.

Under an order by the Troop Commander, Konstantinov was removed from his position and handed over for trial to the Military Tribunal, and brigade commander Cde. Shapkin was issued a reprimand for a complete lack of leadership in the operation. The Brigade’s prosecutor is conducting an investigation into the idle radio sets. The chief of the Brigade’s Special Department was instructed to ascertain whether wrecking activity took place regarding the communications, and if such facts are confirmed, to take up the material for his own proceedings.

In order to pursue the gangs operating in the Karatau mountains, a squadron numbering 45 sabers under the command of the Squadron Commander of the 79th Cavalry Regiment, Cde. Samarkin, was deployed from Uialy on the evening of 29 April. At noon on 30 April, in the Khodzhi-Mastan mountains (15 km. east of Aral-Kurgan), the squadron attacked a gang (with undetermined numbers and commander) that had been occupying a commanding height (elevation 848) and rocky notches. The squadron engaged the gang in a battle that lasted until 2000 hours. The band, occupying a position of advantage, attempted to outflank the squadron, but was pushed back by machinegun fire and made use of the darkness to escape in a southerly direction, having lost 18 men killed. Samarkin’s squadron lost two horses (killed). The squadron in the battle fired 2,100 rounds and 20 grenades. The basmach gang fired at least 2,000 rounds. The squadron did not pursue the gang, since the horses were exhausted.

The squadron of Uzbek Cavalry Regiment under the Lenin[?] Squadron Commander operating against Kur Artyk’s band on 30 April came upon a gang from Kur Artyk’s group under the command of Aliat Palvan numbering 100 men in the vicinity of Karyiagach (10 km. east of Kyzyl-Mazar). As a result of the battle the band, having lost six men killed, was dispersed.

On 29 April, a band of 200-250 men under Utan Bek attempted to cross into our territory at the Piandzh post in the area of the Buri border. Thanks to the vigorous actions of border units, the attempt was beaten back with a loss by the band of 46 men killed on our shore and about 30 men on the Afghan shore. In the evening of 29 April major Afghan government troops came to the crossing.

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Relationships among the commanders

In summary No. 5/op. we already noted that the commanding officer of the 79th Cavalry Regiment, Cde. Grosberg, does not have the necessary authority his superiors. This impression is further reinforced by the nature of Grosberg’s conversation on 28 April with squadron commander Binko and Regiment School commander Gadalin. Binko and Gadalin were ordered to deploy their detachments into the mountains, who before the deployment came to Regiment Commander Grosberg trying to talk him out of the deployment, based on a lack of precise information on the movements of the bands and the lack of sufficient forage and food. Grosberg was unable, in response to the reasoning by Binko and Gadalin, to provide a completely precise order, offering the same judgment for his own part, and only the intervention of the Deputy Regiment Commander, Marra, put an end to the squadron commanders’ unceremonious behavior with the Regiment Commander.

<<Notation in the margins: “Not quite true. Cde. Marra reported otherwise Cde. S.” >>

Mood in the units.

The top commanders and Red Army soldiers of the 81st Cavalry Regiment, in view of the regiment’s deployment to Sary-Assia and in view of the fact that while they were in the new combat zone there have not been any clashes with the bandit gangs, are voicing frustration about their passivity in the fight against the basmachi. The passivity of the detachments is due to the fact that neither our intelligence nor the troop reconnaissance is finding the bands. All the information about the bands is speculative and the measures taken on it have not produced any positive results, hence the frustration that the resources of the soldiers and horses are being expended for no purpose whatsoever.

The top commanders express the view that more results would be achieved in the fight against the basmach gangs if each detachment were given the task of liquidating specific bands and if the detachments in their operational decisions were more autonomous:

“If they would grant the detachment commanders more autonomy, there would no longer be any gangs. Incoherent leadership causes exhaustion in the detachments and puts horses out of action.” (Squadron commander Baranov).

“If detachment commanders were given more autonomy and initiative, they would be separated from the general leadership of the Regiment’s command and would create something like guerrilla detachments, and then each detachment commander, feeling personal responsibility, would be more active in conducting the liquidation of basmach gangs” (Platoon commander Podshivalin).

“If this is how we are going to fight, we will not destroy the basmachi anytime soon. A unit should not be kept on a leash, they should be let loose, then the bands will not hide but will go at us themselves, but they will never attack a regiment or a brigade.” (Platoon commander Kozlov)

The soldiers’ mood.

The mood of the Red Army soldiers, on the whole, is sound. The operations that have been developing successfully lately have created a turnaround for the better in the Red Army soldiers’ mood. There have been almost no complaints at all that the units are moving around to no purpose and are not seeing basmachi. In the Uzbek units, however, some Red Army soldiers have poor morale. This is largely attributable to the death of Deputy Chief of the Brigade Political Dept. Makeev, about which all the units are aware, as a disgraceful incident for the units of the Uzbek Cavalry Brigade.

As regards negative aspects in the Red Army soldiers’ attitudes, there have been isolated instances. For example:

Red Army soldier Posmitny in the 79th Cavalry Regiment, a middle peasant and nonparty member, said during lunch with the 9th mountain infantry regiment on 23 April: “Right now music is playing for us, we’re being well fed, but there is fighting on the border

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and that is where they will soon send us. That’s why the music is playing.”

Red Army soldier Katan in the Engineering Squadron, a worker and nonparty member, said: “Why are we being sent out to no purpose—they don’t care about us or the horses, and on top of that they’re making us freeze in the mountains.” (79th regiment)

Also in the 79th Cavalry Regiment, Red Army soldier Kirichenko, in a conversation with Red Army soldiers, spread provocative rumors to the effect that the basmachi would take Stalinabad on 1 May. He said:

“I heard from workers that a letter was planted with them that said that Soviet rule in the city of Stalinabad would last until 1 May, since on 1 May Stalinabad will be occupied by the basmachi.” The Red Army soldiers present responded to Kirichenko that this was counterrevolutionary propaganda by people who do not like Soviet rule.

Relations with the populace.

No instances of rudeness or other immoral occurrences have been reported in the Red Army soldiers’ relations with the populace except for an outrageous incident—the rape by Red Army soldiers in the Tadzhik Battalion of the wife of a dehkan [peasant]. The name of the Red Army soldier has not been established. The plenipotentiary representative is conducting an investigation. And another incident that took place in the village of Naryn, where the chairman of the village Soviet, the plenipotentiary of the Sowing Commission and the commander of the Muslim detachment drew up a report stating that the commander of the 3rd Squadron of the 79th Cavalry Regiment, Cde. Samarkin, while abusing them with foul language, demanded that they immediately provide rams and cookies. Samarkin was not right to abuse the representatives of the aforementioned bodies, but he was completely right in his demands, since the people who drew up the report were disgracefully slow in providing food, and Samarkin, in carrying out his operational mission, had to move further on after first feeding the detachment.

The Red Army soldiers as a whole express harsh displeasure with the populace for its indifferent or nearly indifferent attitude in the fight against the basmachi.

“The population is obligated not only to help the Soviet government and the Red Army fight the basmachi, but should itself liquidate the basmachi. There will no longer be any basmachi only when the entire population rises up against them.” (Red Army soldier Boiko in the 81st Cavalry Regiment, middle peasant, nonparty member).

“Let the population itself liquidate the basmachi. Where I come from in Siberia the bandits were liquidated by the muzhiks without the Red Army’s help. But since here the population disagrees with the policy of state farms and collective farms, you can’t foist it on them by force, so that’s why it isn’t doing much to help us fight the basmachi.” (Red Army soldier Romanov in 81st Cavalry Regiment, middle peasant, nonparty member)

Based on the above statements by Red Army soldiers characterizing the passivity of the populace in the fight against the basmachi, Red Army soldiers are concluding for themselves that the populace sympathizes with the basmachi, and are therefore are raising the question of whether it is necessary to take repressive measures against the well-to-do elements in the village and clergy:

“The entire population, except perhaps for party members, is acting as accomplices to the basmach gangs. If it were not for this, the basmachi would have been routed long ago. The detachments

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move around to no purpose, and the population is not saying where the basmachi are. Hostages should be taken, then they will talk, and if one bey or mullah from each village is executed, then it will really be good.” (Red Army soldier in 81st Cavalry Regiment, middle peasant, nonparty member).

<<Marginal note: “A pretty sober-minded practical prescription.”>>

It must be said that the populace’s attitude toward the Red Army units in certain villages leads to this conclusion. For example, residents of the villages of Shalipaya and Dyisho of the jamagats [people’s assemblies] of Shakhrinau Raion, when the units appeared, fled into the mountains and hid. Only women stayed in the villages, and they said all the men were in the field or at the bazaar; there are never any vekils [legal representatives] in the villages.

Miscellaneous.

Killing of Regiment School student Ulianenko.

On 25 April 1931 Red Army soldiers Ivanov and Ulianenko of the 10th Mountain Infantry Regiment were escorting a wagon train through the Ganzhina gorge (27 km. northwest of Kurgan-Tiube). En route Red Army soldier Ivanov, due to careless handling of his rifle, fired a shot and killed Red Army soldier Ulianenko, a student at the Regiment School. An investigation is under way. Details will be reported later.

Firing on own units.

On 27 April 1931 a company of the 11th Mountain Infantry Regiment, in the vicinity of the village of Kul-Bulak, fired on the Regiment School of the 10th Cavalry Regiment and the Uzbek Cavalry Squadron. As a result of the fusillade, three Red Army soldiers were killed and seven wounded. Details of the circumstances of the fusillade are being determined by investigators.

On the night of 29-30 April a sentry post on the Dangara State Farm from the Uzbek Cavalry Regiment under the command of the commander of the machinegun squadron (name unknown) opened fire from a heavy machinegun on people checking on the sentries, even though it was a well-lit night and it was clear that there were only two pedestrians, who in addition had identified themselves. This incident is due solely to the alarmism of the sentries, since despite the fact that the machinegun fired four lengthy salvos, none of the sentry inspectors was wounded at a distance of 50 paces.

Chief of Field Special Department of the Tadzhikistan Troop Group [signature] (Vysokinsky)

Issued in six copies and sent out: Copies 1 and 2 to the Chief of the Special Dept. of the Joint State Political Directorate [OGPU] of the Central Asian Military District

Copy 3 to the Chief of the Group Political Dept., Cde. Safrazbekian Here.

Copy 4 to the Secretary of the CC of the CP(B) of Tadzhikistan, Guseinov.

Copy 5 to the Chairman of the GPU of the Tadzhik SSR, Dorofeev.

No. 6 In the files of the Field Special Dept. of the Group

True copy. Criminal investigator of Group Special Dept. (Fedotichev) [signature]

No. 28/Op

2 May 1931

City of Stalinabad