The Kurdish Card in Contemporary Russian Policy In the Middle East

In fact Syria is hardly the only place where Moscow plays its Kurdish card/s.  It does so as well in Iraq and Turkey.  In Iraq, for example, it appeals to the Kurds’ hope for independence and statehood, not Islam.  Thus in Iraq the co-optative tactic is used to manipulate if not threaten to fragment a very troubled polity.  And the policy instruments here are energy and arms.  Russian interest in Kurdish energy started once the EU expressed a similar interest in 2010.[i]  In 2012 Exxon-Mobil gave up its project in West Qurna because it could obtain better terms from the KRG in Iraqi Kurdistan.  This decision triggered great anger in Baghdad who was and is determined to prevent Kurdistan from entering into foreign energy deals independently of its authority for obvious political reason.  And in order to replace Exxon-Mobil Baghdad looked to Russian and/or Chinese firms.[ii]   However, Moscow, true to its congenital determination to have a card to play with everyone, and its principled tactic (i.e. this tactic is one of Moscow’s basic principles of action) of complete flexibility regarding   issues of states’ territorial integrity and self-determination has been active in energy deals in Kurdistan as well with Lukoil playing a major role as an energy exporter in Kurdistan.[iii]

So in 2012 Gazpromneft inked two deals with Kurdish authorities becoming the fourth major oil company to enter into Iraqi Kurdistan Gazpromneft acquired a 60% share in the 1780KM2 Garmian Block and 80 % of the 474KM2 Shakal Block.[iv]  This deal came about  even as Russia was negotiating with Iraq over arms sales and West Qurna.  Meanwhile Iraq sought to force Gazprom to cancel its deals with Kurdistan in November 2012 or else lose access to the Badra oilfield near Iran that it had acquired in 2009 and that was supposed to begin production in August 2013.  Iraq’s government termed any contract with Kurdistan illegal as it was not approved by the Iraqi government.[v] 

Then Moscow decided to retain and even expand its dealings with Kurdistan even though that antagonized Iraq.  Russia hosted the president of the Kurdish region, Massoud Barzani, in February 2013.  At these meetings both sides discussed key political questions and energy issues and possibilities for further Russian energy contracts with Kurdish authorities.[vi].  At those talks, and despite Baghdad’s remonstrations with Moscow, Gazpromneft singed a deal to enter into a Kurdish oil project, the Halabja Block.[vii]  This deal duly marked the third Russian energy project in Kurdistan.

Despite the February 2013 and subsequent deals with Kurdistan President Putin apparently kept the Iraqi government informed of what it is doing and may also be acting in this fashion to distance Kurdistan from a flirtation with Turkey because both Russia and Iraq oppose Turkey’s claims to being an energy hub and have a shared interest in keeping Turkey from getting access to Kurdish energy holdings as well.[viii]  Indeed were Turkey to become a major energy hub it would then, as is the case with the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) originating in Azerbaijan, export that gas or oil to other European countries and thus undercut Russia’s showpiece South Stream project, the main instrument of its foreign and energy policy to isolate Ukraine and enhance Russian influence throughout the Balkans and Eastern Europe. But there are larger dimensions to this triangle of Russia, Turkey, and Iraq beyond that fact. 

Were Turkey to emancipate itself further from dependence on Russian energy not only would this limit Russia’s influence and the utility of the South Stream project, it would also enhance Azerbaijan’s smaller but competitive project of selling the Balkans and Central Europe, gas from the Tans-Anatolian pipeline or TANAP that will now connect  at the Turkish Bulgarian border to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP).  Russia needs to keep Turkey as dependent as possible on its gas in order to retain a means of pressure and influence on Turkey, but also to preserve its position in the Balkans and even to some degree in the Caucasus and Middle East.  And if it cannot prevent the Kurds form selling their gas to Turkey, its goal then becomes to have a foot in both the Iraqi and KRG camps and ensure that Russia gets its cut or rents for the sale of Kurdish and Iraqi gas to Turkey.  And, of course, to the extent that it can use Kurds against Turkey Russia also keeps Turkey from reducing its dependence upon Russian energy.  In other words Russian policy is completely opportunistic, obstructive of genuine stability in the Middle East, intended to maximize Russian flexibility and freedom of maneuver without committing itself irrevocably to any one side except insofar as they oppose the US.

At the same time Moscow’s leverage upon the Iraqi Kurds also gave and gives it enhanced leverage upon Baghdad which repeatedly has been forced to hold its tongue and not protest about Russian coercive pressures or its engagement with the Iraqi Kurds and deprivation of the Iraqi budget of revenues from those energy platforms.  Precisely because it fears what Moscow do to embolden the Iraqi Kurds and promote their centrifugal tendencies regarding independence from Iraq, Baghdad has repeatedly had to give in to Russian terms or not protest Russian encroachments upon it.[ix]  Moreover, that Russian engagement with Iraq’s Kurds is growing as Rosneft has recently signed a new agreement with  the Iraqi Kurds.  Apart from plans to explore for more oil and gas holdings in Kurdish territory, “Rosneft will get access to the major regional transportation system with the throughput capacity of 700 thousand bbl per day, which is planned to be expanded up to 1mln bbl per day by the end of 2017.”[x]  Beyond granting Rosneft access to the KRG pipeline and ability to expand its capacity, Rosneft will then refine this oil in Germany.  It also, according to Jabbar Kadir, an advisor to former KRG Prime Minister Barham Salih, Turkey now is displaced from managing the KRG’s energy affairs, it also reflects Moscow’s hidden belief that Iraq will be divided,  if not into three states, then into three federal regions and therefore it has slowed down working with the government in Baghdad.  And should Baghdad object to this deal that deprives them of significant budgetary revenues it will be told that the Americans make deals with the KRG so we will too.[xi]

The Kurdish question in Iraq (and by implication in Syria and Turkey) assumes even greater importance in the wake of the impending September 25 referendum among Iraqi Kurds that is expected to produce a vote for independence.  Even though none of the major Middle Eastern government hosting sizable Kurdish populations (Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria supports independence, the US supports the general principle of the rights of the Kurds to self-determination as part of its partnership with the Kurds against ISIS and some observers think an independent Kurdistan could become an American military base even if that seriously antagonizes Turkey and Russia has ot declared itself.  But Professor Nourhan El-Sheikh of Cairo University argues in a Russian publication of the Valdai Club that Russia should promote broad Kurdish self-rule within Iraq as the best practical alternative because it cannot deny to the Kurds the right of self-determination it espoused in Crimea (and we know what that meant).[xii]  And, of course, that outcome means a permanently enfeebled Iraq vulnerable to Russian pressure as well as a Kurdish entity beholden to and needful of Russian support.

In looking at Russia utilization of the Kurdish card in Syria and Turkey we can anticipate finding that Moscow deliberately uses that card not just promote restive minorities to weaken targeted states but also to put diplomatic pressure on Ankara and Damascus on behalf of its own interests.  As a recent paper observes, “You do not need ISIS to prevail for as long as Turkey has an ongoing conflict with the Kurdish nation in the broader region.”[xiii]  In Syria, Moscow’s Kurdish game also balances Syrian and Turkish considerations viewed from Moscow.

While space precludes a discussion of all the twists and turns of Moscow’s posture regarding the YPQ and Kurds in Syria, it is clear that from the outset Moscow sought to bring a many possible opposition groups, including the Kurds into, the political process of peacemaking in Syria.[xiv]  Similarly Putin has said that since the Kurdish factor is a real one in Syria and Kurdish forces are among the most efficient opponents of ISIS we work with them if only to deconflict our forces, a clear sign that Moscow intends to keep this card in its hand and use it to constrain Turkey whose opposition to any form of contiguous Syrian Kurdish territory or political assertion is obsessive.[xv]  Thus Moscow has also hitherto supported YPQ military actions in Syria to constrain Turkish military actions in Syria.[xvi]  Thus, as of this writing, in July 2017 there are real possibilities that the YPQ and Turkish forces will come into a direct clash around Afrin canton.  Since Putin and Assad’s forces need to move into territory now occupied by Turkish forces around Idlib it now appears that Moscow is inclining to meet Ankara’s needs at the expense of its Kurdish allies.[xvii]  Finally, in an effort that evokes the old tactic of using Soviet Central Asia to attract the Middle East Moscow has raised the idea of sending Chechen policemen to patrol captured areas of Syria and is now talking to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan about them sending troops as well.[xviii] 

[i] Aziz Barzani, “Russia and the Kurdistan Region: a Rapprochement,” www.impr.org.tr, accessed on January 7, 2014; Eldar Kasayev, “Iraqi Kurdistan and the Future of the Russian Gas Business,” www.en.internationalffairs.ru,  October 9, 2010

[ii] “Iraq Wants Russians to Replace Exxon at West Qurna: Report,” Reuters, Moscow, October 11, 2012

[iii] James Sherr, Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia’s Influence Abroad: London: Chatham House, 2013, pp. 61-62

[iv] Sinan Salaheddin, “Russia’s Gazprom Neft Inks Deals With Iraq Kurds,” Seattle Times and Associated Press, August 2, 2012, www.seattletimes.com

[v] “Iraq Pressures Russia’s Gazprom to Quit Kurdistan,” BBC News, November 9, 2012

[vi] M.K. Bhadrakumar, “Russia Renews Kurdish Bonds,” Asia Times Online, February 25, 2013, www.atimes.com

[vii] “Russian Gazprom Neft Takes 60% Stake in Iraqi Kurdistan Oil Project,” www.ekurd.net,  February 27, 2013; “Russia Gazprom Neft Signs  Kurdistan Oil Project Deal-Reports,” Reuters,  February 26, 2013

[viii] M.K. Bhadrakumar, “Russia Renews Kurdish Bonds,” www.valdaiclub.com, February 27, 2013

[ix] Blank, ”Energy and Russia’s High-Stakes Game in Iraq,” 

[x] “Rosneft and Iraqi Kurdistan Government Agree to Expand Strategic Cooperation,’ https://www.rosneft.com/press/releases/item/186811/, June 2, 2017

[xi] Mahmut Bozarslan, “Iraqi-Kurdistan-Russia Oil Deal Could Have Major Implications For Region,” www.al-monitor.com, June 20, 2017

[xii] Nourhan El-Sheikh, “Kurdistan Referendum: Challenges and Consequences,”   www.valdaiclub.lcom, July 13, 2017

[xiii] Hakan Gunneriusson and Sacha Dov Bachmann, “Western Denial and Russian Control: How Russia’s National Security Strategy Threatens a Western-Based Approach To Global Security, the Rule of Law, and Globalization,” Polish Political /Science Yearbook, XLVI, No. 1, 2017, p. 21

[xiv] “Russia’s Lavrov Urges Dialogue With Government By Syrian Opposition,” RIA Novosti, August 31, 2015, Retrieved From BBC Monitoring

[xv] Ahu Ozyurt, “White House vs Kremlin House,”  Hurriyet, May 17, 2017, Retrieved From BBC Monitoring

[xvi] James Pothecary, “Russia a Fair-Weather Friend For Syria’s Kurds,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, www.jamestown.org, XV, NO. 11, June 2, 2017; A Kurdish-Russian Deal Against Turkey,!” www.aranews.net March 5, 2017

[xvii] Metin Gurcan, “Ankara’s offer To Moscow: Give Us Afrin For Idlib,” www.al-monitor.com, July 3, 2017; Sami Mousayed, “New Front In Syria As Turks Rout Kurds With Putin’s Blessing,”  Asia Times Online, www.atimes.com, July 7, 2017