Доклад генконсула в Бухаре Нагорного "Басмачество в Бухаре" Report from the conul general in Bukhara, Nagorny, "The Basmachi movement in Bukhara"

Translation

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The Basmachi movement in Bukhara.

I. Bukhara's prerevolutionary Basmachi movement.

1. The patrimonial nature of social life among the tribes of Eastern Bukhara. 2. Conflict between the eastern beks and the emirate government, as well as the role of tsarism in this conflict. 3. Emirate policy in the conflict with eastern beks.

Cde. Safar.

To some extent, the history of the Basmachi movement in Bukhara extends into the distant past. The origins of this social phenomenon reach back to long before the Bukhara revolution.

Like the other countries of Central Asia, Bukhara  was only introduced to Western culture in recent decades, but even now, in the areas farthest from the Republic's center, including many regions of Eastern Bukhara, old patrimonial ways are deeply ingrained among the tribes populating this area.

Since today's Basmachi movement in Bukhara developed particularly strongly in the country's East, to investigate the causes and goals of the Basmachi movement you have to begin by examining the social conditions under which this movement developed specifically in the Republic's Eastern half.

Both under the emirs and today, one finds areas of Eastern Bukhara where tribes maintain the institution of tribal chiefs whose actions are completely independent of any sort of central government in Bukhara, whether the government of the old emirs or, as today, the government of the new Republic's Soviet institutions.

The social way of life among the Lokai and Marka, the "Uzbeks" and "Tajiks," and other tribes of Eastern Bukhara, has elements in common with Western Europe's capitalist era. Here, it seems perfectly natural and legitimate to the population that the beks, on the one hand, have basically limitless control over the property and lives of tribe members and wage internecine wars against other neighboring tribes over petty tribal and personal interests. Along with the most powerful beks, among whom currently figure Ibrahim-Karaul-Begi, Ishan-Sultan, and Daulet-Man-Bii, there is a whole range of smaller bek patriarchs who are something akin to vassals to the more powerful ones.

All these beks levy their own taxes and formally adhere to Sharia law, under which every tribe member is obligated to put five percent of his income (the VESH-TEM-TIR tax) at the disposal of the patriarch to be spent on communal needs. In fact, the beks do what they please with the taxes collected and in practice do not limit themselves to the five-percent norm.

Due to the total ignorance and political backwardness of the population, educated by mullahs in the spirit of religious fanaticism, the beks, enjoying the support of these mullahs, essentially have a free hand. Legal procedure either does not exist or is exercised in keeping with certain traditions, but often the role of judge is played by the bek himself, who sometimes punishes his tribe members with gratuitous expropriations from the guilty party, or even corporal punishment, right up to the death penalty. Most remarkable is that the population considers this social and legal order to be legitimate and natural, and despite periodic signs of discontent, people generally tolerate even gross violations of the traditional order by the beks.

The backwardness of the tribal social order in Eastern Bukhara is mainly due to isolation from other eastern peoples caused by the particular topographic conditions  of the land they inhabit. Eastern Bukhara itself is an exceptionally mountainous region surrounded on almost all four sides by tall peaks that make it difficult for the tribes to trade with other peoples and generally preventing 

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civilization from penetrating the country.

Due to the topographic conditions, these tribes, which are engaged in cattle breeding and agriculture, are almost economically independent of the states that surround them and provide their own clothing and other items needed by a primitive people without the help of a foreign market.

Of course, world capitalism, as it seeks out new markets, has had some influence on the economic life of the tribes of Eastern Bukhara, but the communication that international trade has established with this population is very weak. This explains the backwardness and sociopolitical relations of the eastern tribes of Bukhara, the backdrop against which the bestial patterns of the contemporary Basmachi movement are being woven.

As in any feudal society where there is no strong and unified authority, warring tribes are divided, means of communication are poor, and there is no guarantee of safe trade relations, in Bukhara, especially its Eastern half, there have long been small gangs of Basmachi bandits infiltrating locales and pillaging commercial caravans. These small gangs, distinguished by the audacity and boldness of their raids, were, it could be said, the forefather's of today's Basmachi. Even today, in addition to the Basmachi, who have a political coloration, we see  commonplace bandits with the sole aim of personal gain. Such, for example, is the currently famous Dzhavar, who is making himself out to be a "political  champion" fighting for the rights of Bukhara's people.

 A general discontent with the abuses of beks mentioned above may have served as a social impetus for the first Basmachi, bold by nature and refusing to "tolerate injustice" by their tribal leaders and fleeing from them, setting out on the path of banditry. At the same time, the lack of a unified and strong authority in areas under bek rule and of the power and means of maintaining at least the order that beks considered natural for their tribes, the inability to seriously fight for this order against bandit Basmachi, paved the way for them to exist and even develop their antisocial activity. Such were the first forms of the Basmachi movement even under the emirs in prerevolutionary Bukhara.

In prerevolutionary Bukhara, the emirate government tried to play the role of a unifying factor in the fight against the Basmachi movement, on the one hand, and against the particularism of individual beks on the other. To a certain degree, the emirs succeeded in this in Western Bukhara, where, by means of at least some organization of their own troops and with help from Russia, satisfactory results were achieved in fighting petty banditry (the Basmachi movement) and in subordinating the power of former beks.

Here in Western Bukhara, the emirs' attempts to restore their government ultimately led to the organization of statehood, of the Asian sort, of course. In Eastern Bukhara, the task of subordinating the beks was much harder. Often the emirs were forced to ask for help from tsarist Russia and its army, but even that did not always achieve the desired results. Eastern Bukhara's uniquely difficult terrain hindered the success of operations in terms of the emirate government's total subjugation of this area. The eastern beks recognized this government only formally, and in parallel with central government taxes, which were paid extremely haphazardly by the population, taxes continued to be collected to benefit the local beks, who lost none of their influence or their material situation.

In the best case for the emirate government, the subordination of all the beks and tribes in Eastern Bukhara meant collecting insignificant taxes. One member of the current Bukhara government, speaking at a government conference about the emirate era, quite correctly characterized Eastern Bukhara's  fictitious subordination to the emirs with the following words: "The Uzbeks and Kirgiz there were internally almost completely independent and taxes were only paid to emirate officials. It could be said that the Gharm Viliiat was not under the control of the emir at all."

Such was the actual state of

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central government authority and its influence in Eastern Bukhara, and this situation did not improve despite almost forty years of Russian tsarism's active and obliging support of the emirate government.

In their struggle against the emirs, the eastern beks tenaciously defended their rights as tribal patriarchs. Furthermore, in their efforts to influence the population, they resorted to agitation against the emirs as Jadids (infidels) and traitors to Islam because of their alliance with Russia. Exploiting the sociopolitical differences between Eastern and Western Bukhara (differences in the forms of taxes and  so forth), the beks successfully waged their struggle for independence and rose up against the tyranny of the emirs, especially their officials, pretending to be a progressive social force defending the sovereignty and independence of the tribes. It is this circumstance that deluded and is still deluding (albeit now for different reasons--supposedly the counterrevolutionary nature of today's BHSR [Bukharan People's Soviet Republic]) many who want to examine and assess the political nature of the popular rebellions in Eastern Bukhara that have merged with the Basmachi movement.

This struggle by the beks and the clergy (mullahs) that surround them against the emirate government did not merge with the social movement that arose among the local population out of discontent with the beks themselves, a movement that subsequently degenerated into a form of Basmachism. The beks' struggle, so to speak, was waged on two fronts: on one hand, they were fighting for their independence, and, on the other, they were struggling against the Basmachi as an antisocial element, albeit spawned by their own tyranny.

Given the difficulties involved in subjugating the beks using their government's armed forces alone, the Bukhara emirs turned to other ways of strengthening their state in Eastern Bukhara.

They tried everything--diplomacy; the system of sending gifts that is extensively developed in Asian countries; the awarding of "Emirate stars"; inviting beks to be "guests" in Bukhara; and so forth--and it should be noted that by showing a degree of attention and respect to the local beks, the emirs probably did more to strengthen their influence than they could have through actual force of arms. In the history of the Emirate of Bukhara there are instances of private visits by eastern beks to the emir "as a guest" for an extended time, thereby establishing an overall connection between the Eastern and Western parts of Bukhara.

It is possible that, with time, visits by beks to "Holy Old Bukhara" (Bukhara-Sharif) and their introduction to the ideas and practices of at least Asian statehood would, over time, have overcome the factual isolation of Bukhara's two halves and connected the entire country into a single whole. Overall, however, the isolation and difficult terrain of Eastern Bukhara referred to previously, along with the exceptional weakness of the emirate government's rudimentary apparatus impeded the restoration of a single authority for the entire khanate. The Russian Revolution, which had a colossal impact on Bukhara, turned a page in the history of this people and put an end to the question of possible roles for and the prospects of the emirate government in regard to unifying Bukhara's disparate regions.

II. The Development of Basmachism in Bukhara after the Revolution

1. The weakness of the new Soviet Bukhara government. 2. Conflict between the beks' and clergy's interests and the principles of Soviet rule. 3. Agitation by the toppled emir and the mistakes of the Soviet Bukhara government. 4. Particular mistakes by the BNSR government regarding the conditions under which red RSFSR units would be used. 5. Negotiations between the BNSR government and the Basmachi and the failure of these negotiations. 6. The internal organization of today's Basmachi movement and the population's attitude toward it.

The Russian revolution inspired certain social

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segments of Bukhara--and, it should be added, only in its Western part--to carry out a political coup and put an end to the tyranny of the emirate government.

On the ruins of the old and decrepit emirate, the edifice of a new Soviet Republic began to be built. It now became clear, however, just how far Bukhara lagged behind Russia, its revolutionary neighbor and inspiration. The Bukhara Soviet government itself, despite the fact that the Bukhara Communist Party was officially in power, consisted of a heterogeneous assortment of social forces with little in common with the organizationally fused force that that is the supreme Soviet bodies of the RSFSR.

One of the driving forces behind the Bukhara revolution would have preferred to literally follow in the footsteps of Soviet Russia in building its state, utterly ignoring the objective conditions of their country, while another, which was officially at the governmental helm and holding the first in check, was trying to essentially turn the tide toward a simple bourgeois coup and was less a revolutionary force than a progressive-bourgeois one. Finally, a third force involved in building the republic was almost a temporary traveling companion to both forces the first two and, given the chance, could even prove to be a counterrevolutionary stronghold.

The country's political backwardness and the exceptional immaturity of the masses and even the leadership and governing groups make it very difficult to create a strong government. The political unpreparedness of government officials provides fertile ground for the emergence of narrow-group and petty-personal interests spawning convoluted conflicts that will sap the Republic's energy. As a result, the new Soviet government apparatus that has replaced the old one is just as decrepit. Considering the financial and economic crisis the country is experiencing, the Soviet apparatus is even weaker. This situation is evident even in the center of Bukhara, where the best forces of the Bukhara Republic are concentrated. Matters are even worse in the provinces.

While the center's political and organizational  work can be characterized as "marking time," the situation with soviet work in the provinces is even more lamentable, since local government is staffed by absolutely unsuitable individuals (for lack of any others) who do absolutely nothing. Here, government is as weak as it could be and in essence is government in name only. The unprepared officials who come from the center in the best case are drawn into doing nothing and, in the worst, wreak petty tyranny and utter lawlessness, thereby squandering the public' s goodwill.

To summarize, the problem of creating a truly authoritative government in the viliiats of the Bukhara Republic, even in the West, is yet to be solved, although the Government has made attempts and is still making attempts in this area. In regard to Eastern Bukhara it should be said that there have barely even been attempts to create a government, and where there have, they were rather unsuccessful, since the Revolutionary and Executive Committees were populated with outright reactionaries. Invested with new functions, these government "actors" simply did not act. To compare the government and the personal influence of individual beks, the evidence would favor the latter, and this despite the tyranny that the beks have wreaked and continue to wreak.

Representatives from the center traveling to Eastern Bukhara cease to be under the government's control due to their isolation and themselves start down the path of tyranny, discrediting the Soviet government. When the public sees such representatives of the new government, they become perplexed in their understanding and opinion of the revolution that has taken place in Bukhara. "The beks are lawless," the dehkan reasons, "but so is the new government." The conservative mind of the Muslim, whom tradition has taught to subjugate himself to the beks, can at least better understand the rule of the Muslim bek than the rule of the "Jadids"--the "infidels."

The weakness demonstrated by the new republic's apparatus has naturally been exploited by all enemies of Soviet rule.

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The Republic's lack of strength was helpful to both the eastern beks, who had not lost their influence over the local population, and to the Basmachi, who were growing in number.

Below I will explain how the common benefit offered by exploiting the new government's weakness united these enemies of the republic and lent even the Basmachi a political aura. First I should reveal why the beks and clergy so hate the organization and installation of Soviet rule in Bukhara.

As explained above, the institution of bekism was based on new principles of tribal life, and this order was sanctified by traditions and supported by the clergy (the uluma). The clergy had an interest in preserving the power of the beks for purely material reasons and this is why the mullahs acted in solidarity with the beks. This closeness between the mullahs and the local beks even under the emirs forced the clergy to urge the population to fight the emir for the beks' independence, although the emirate was still more appealing to the clergy than the "godless ideas" of the Soviet government, which, despite the distance between Eastern Bukhara and Russia, were well-known in their basic outline to the beks and the clergy.

What is most interesting is the possibility that the beks, given a certain political compromise and a skillful approach by the Soviet government, might still have reconciled themselves to the situation created by the revolution, but the mullahs of Eastern Bukhara, sensing the danger that the beks could "betray" them, now were decisively and tenaciously working toward the restoration of the emirate, since they could under no circumstances reconcile themselves to the principles of Soviet rule. This is why the eastern uluma changed their attitude toward the emir, despite conflict with him in the past.

Writing these lines after a personal conversation with one of the Dushanbe District beks, Ibragim-Karaul-Begi , and the mullah Kaim-Taksoba, what most strikes me is the subtle difference in interests between the beks and the clergy. The mullahs, sensing the importance of maintaining their authority while preserving the masses' ignorance and while educating them in the spirit of religious fanaticism, are tenaciously fighting for the emirate. When the uluma is asked "can't your religion exist without restoring the emirate?" the mullahs decisively answer (and force the beks to say the same): "No."

The creation of the Soviet Republic in Bukhara has alarmed the mullahs, those vultures, who feed on the people's ignorance and have thrown them into a decisive struggle against the new government. The clergy certainly understands that the Soviet government means education for the masses, and this is tantamount to death for the uluma.

In their struggle, both the beks and the clergy are trying to concentrate all of their district's available armed forces made up of their tribe members, putting aside their past attitude toward the local Basmachi pillagers in the literal sense of that word, calling on them, and everyone else, to wage "holy war," blessing and leading Basmachi gangs and channeling their efforts into the struggle against the new government, especially against the Russians, who have inspired "godlessness" and equal rights.

The interests of the uluma, major and minor beks, and minor patriarchs unite them into a provisionally coordinated mass, and, throwing the old sort of Basmachi-- who are distinguished by their warlike nature and are very valuable to their common cause--into battle against the Soviet government, they are establishing a common front with them. The Basmachi, if I could be permitted to say, seem to have "reorganized." The uluma and beks have given them a new motivation and a new goal. This does not mean, however, that the mullahs and beks themselves, along with their supporters, call themselves Basmachi. When the question is put to them that way, they shrink from the Basmachi moniker and call themselves representatives of the people and their bands, "armies of Islam." In essence, the two currents of a social movement--Basmachism and bekism--have now merged into a single whole.

Among the factors working against the Soviet Bukhara government, the emir's direct agents who fled to Afghanistan play no small role. These agents have, not without reason, chosen Eastern Bukhara as their arena of action, since, first, there is less risk that they will be captured there and, second, the social conditions described above allow them to be more effective in working to restore the emir.

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From documents and correspondence between emir agents and beks that the BNSR and RSFSR have gained access to, we have a clear understanding of the role of these agents, who have been given authority and, no doubt, material resources by the former emir.

Mistakes made by the Bukhara government, mistakes that are inevitable when a new government is working on such a colossal endeavor as restructuring a country's sociopolitical organization, naturally strengthened the position of the emirate's supporters and provided grounds for successful agitation among politically backward dehkans.

There has been no shortage of such mistakes on the part of Bukhara's new government. When the revolution was still in its infancy, the Soviet government blindly followed the example of the RSFSR's food policy, with its requisitioning of crops, but since there were absolutely no suitable personnel in Bukhara, this requisitioning took extremely distorted forms. Due to poor transportation resources, the food was collected from nearby kishlaks, whose inhabitants were ruined and fled to the mountains, where the Soviet apparatus could not reach them. Due to transportation difficulties, nothing at all was taken from the more distant kishlaks. The way requisitioning was distributed was completely absurd.

Because the financial system was not functioning well yet, people were not compensated at all for requisitioned food. They only knew how to "take" from the kishlaks, but absolutely no equivalent goods were delivered to the kishlaks to compensate for the food, although they had ways to do this. The population drew unfortunate conclusions about the new government, which of course the emir's supporters and beks in Eastern Bukhara, along with the clergy, used in their agitation.

Sensing an acute need for military assistance from Soviet Russia, the Bukhara government, in fighting the Basmachi and generally to bring Eastern Bukhara under its authority, was compelled to rely on RSFSR Red Army detachments. However the Bukhara government totally ignored the interests of the Russian detachments on its territory and made absolutely no effort to correctly organize a way to supply them with food or to solve the problem of satisfactorily billeting these units as they moved through the country or were stationed there. Frequently left to the whims of fate, the Russian detachments, cut off from the center of Bukhara by difficult terrain, suffered severe deprivation and illness, paying tribute to the country in the form of countless fatalities from malaria.

The Russian detachments terrible isolation from the center of Bukhara and the weakness of local government forced the Russian units to find their own supplies, a practice that became an increasingly ingrained custom and "tradition" for the detachments the farther they got from the center. The culmination of this self-supplying was reached in early '22 by the Dushanbe detachment after the events of December, when there wasn't a single representative of the BNSR's local or central government left there.

Beside the self-supplying with food, because of the weakness of the Bukhara Soviet government and their neglect of the question of billeting the detachments fighting the Basmachi, another extremely lamentable phenomenon developed, one fraught with political consequences.

Since the government was not supplying them with fuel, the Russian detachments began to supply themselves in this area as well, and since Bukhara is short on forests and it is extremely difficult to find fuel, the tearing down of structures began, both in the cities occupied by garrisons, and in kishlaks occupied during operations.

It is hard to imagine the degree of destruction. Over the course of the year that the garrisons occupied cities--Guzor, Boisun, Iurchi, Dushanbe and others--they were utterly transformed, and as for small kishlaks along the routes of passing troops, these settlements were literally wiped off the face of the earth in just 5-6 months.

It should be clarified, however, that the Russian units were not the only ones guilty of destroying the settlements and cities. They, one could say, only "started" the destruction, but as soon as a structure began to be torn down to get a piece of wood for fuel, the owner of the "kibitka" would hurriedly tear…completely, trying to transport the remaining

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building material somewhere far away from the major road to the mountains, to which he relocated.

A representative illustration of this is a petition submitted to the local executive committee one fine day by residents of Guzor. Pointing to the fact that the city of Guzor was in any event being destroyed by Russian troops for firewood, the local inhabitants requested permission from the executive committee to move their "kibitkas" (houses) to mountain kishlaks. Only energetic resistance by officials in the center forced the residents of Guzor to stay there and abandon their intention.

The weakness of the Bukhara government repeatedly referred to above and their failure to appreciate the urgent need to pay for food taken from the population for state needs in a timely manner, either with money or goods, led to a situation where the population accumulated IOUs  from various local agencies reaching six billion rubles. Withholding payment of these debts provokes severe discontent even among those loyal to the new government and undermines trust toward food agencies, making further food collection harder with every day. This, in turn, reduces supplies to Russian units, and Red Army troops that are underfed, poorly clothed, and unsatisfactorily billeted are pushed to the point of personal self-supplying that borders on pillaging.

All of the above conditions involved in the Bukhara government's use of RSFSR red troops, as well as its inability to manage the difficult task of supplying detachments helping to restore Soviet rule in Bukhara, stirs the population's animosity and excites sympathy toward the Basmachi, by now controlled by the beks and clergy, who are urging the expulsion of Russians from Bukhara and the restoration of the Emir, claiming that he would bring peace and prosperity to the people of Bukhara.

These are the reasons of an economic nature, so to speak, driving the spread of Basmachism. But there are also reasons of a religious nature, or rather circumstances affecting the religious feelings of the Muslim population.

As has already been stated, the Russian units were very poorly billeted. The supply of suitable housing decreased with every day. Driven by a desire for better accommodations for a particular unit, detachment commanders sometimes used mosques for housing. This mistake was again used by beks and mullahs to strengthen their agitation against the "infidels."

Together, the reasons described here led to widespread Basmachism in Eastern Bukhara by late summer of 1921. The movement encompassed ever more population segments. Alongside cadres of "organized" Basmachi, headed now by beks and uluma, there was a new social segment: dehkans, a purely toiling population element now entering the struggle against the Russians and the new Bukhara government.

Russian detachments, scattered across all of Eastern Bukhara in small garrisons, exhausted by relentless fighting and malaria, and cut off from the rear and its support, were forced to assemble in Dushanbe, from where, with the exception of a small garrison, they were redeployed in Western Bukhara.

The extent of the growing Basmachi movement forced the Bukhara government to seek new ways to eliminate this social phenomenon and to restore Soviet rule in Eastern Bukhara. The ethnic overtones the beks and clergy tried to assign the Basmachi forced the BNSR's Soviet authorities and the RSFSR to create independent Bukhara troops that might have an easier time fighting the Basmachi and more quickly establish the supremacy of the central authorities.

As Basmachism developed, by late summer in 1921 the BNSR government was also facing another question. With every day it was becoming clearer that certain segments of the truly toiling masses of eastern dehkans were being drawn into Basmachism and were turning against the Soviet government both because of the government's own blunders and because of agitation by counterrevolutionary elements. This new Basmachi contingent alone, numbering in the tens of thousands and armed with staffs, compelled negotiations and an attempt to popularize

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the idea of the Soviet government among the masses.

To this end, the center's plenipotentiary (Mukhtar-Vakil) Ata-Khodzhaev entered into negotiations with the Basmachi of Eastern Bukhara in late July, but with extremely poor results. Ata-Khodzhaev was not able to demonstrate the Bukhara government's strength to either the Basmachi or the population at large and was forced to almost capitulate to the conditions presented to him by the Basmachi bosses. The weakness exhibited by Mukhtar-Vakil Ata-Khodzhaev in negotiations with the Basmachi further strengthened the position of the beks and clergy, who took advantage of a break in the fighting during the negotiations to develop their strength and influence.

Negotiations with the Basmachi by the chairman of the All-Bukhara Central Executive Committee and brother of the first Mukhtar-Bakil (sic.), Usman-Khodzaev, who was sent to Eastern Bukhara in October of that year in Ata-Khodzhaev's place for the same purpose, yielded even more lamentable results for the Bukhara Republic. In December, instead of strengthening Soviet rule in this part of the country, Usman-Khodzhaev entered into blatantly treacherous relations with the Basmachi and became an outright traitor.

Such unsuccessful negotiations with the Basmachi, and especially the December events in Dushanbe, put an end to any authority the Soviet government had in Eastern Bukhara. The Russian troops, cut off from the rear, were forced, for political and military reasons, to withdraw from Dushanbe and head for Western Bukhara, to the Boisun area.

This last circumstance undoubtedly did even more to strengthen the authority of the eastern beks for a time and some of them, specifically Ibragim and Ishan-Sultan, together with the well-known Turkish pan-Islamist, Enver-Pasha, advanced into the area of Boisun in an attempt to extend their influence there and continue the fight against the BNSR government.

While in the recent past Basmachism manifested itself in the form of small pillaging gangs, more recently these social forces, under the influence of local beks, as well as through the efforts of outsiders like Enver-Pasha, have been trying to take a more organized form.

The Basmachi core consists of armed defectors from Bukhara detachments, Ali-Rizo and Daniiar, who became traitors and the heads of certain Basmachi gangs. This component of the Basmachi movement has a degree of military training and poise. The beks are organizing other "army of Islam" forces around these cores. Under the supervision of Enver and Ali-Rizo, new Basmachi cadres are being trained and armed with weapons from Afghanistan.

Our information suggests that, unlike the pillaging Basmachi gangs of the past, which naturally relied on "volunteers," since early '22 the beks have been carrying out all sorts of "mobilizations" of tribe members from the kishlaks, each of which are required to supply one man for every five capable of carrying a weapon. Furthermore, there is also information that those mobilized undergo tests of their fighting ability. It is difficult to know how reliable this information is, especially if we consider that Eastern Bukhara probably lacks personnel capable of assessing recruits' fitness. To maintain their authority and especially to acquire food supplies for the "armies of Islam," the beks distribute their bands throughout small garrisons placed near large kishlaks, which are then compelled to feed them.

The main fighting core of the Basmachi detachments have their own, so to speak, "cadre commanders." The Basmachi ranks overall consist, however, not of detachments armed with modern weaponry, but of hordes of dehkan horsemen with primitive weaponry in the form of staffs. Basmachi with this weaponry make up at least eight-tenths of the total force, which currently numbers 30,000–40,000 men throughout all Bukhara.

We should now describe the rest of the population's attitude toward the Basmachi.

Much of the population does not sympathize with the Basmachi, but this does not mean they sympathize with the Soviet government, rather that food requisition for the "army of Islam" and outright pillaging by Basmachi has been a significant burden on the peaceful toiling population.

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Recently, in connection with the events in Dushanbe and the clearing of Russian troops from Eastern Bukhara, the authority of the beks has no doubt grown and perhaps a sense of fear and respect toward the power of local beks has taken hold among the population. However, we cannot be certain how devoted the dehkan are to the beks, who are surrounded by all sorts of Basmachi. Whatever the prospects for Basmachism in the short term, because of the simplicity of its social makeup, it will inevitably disintegrate in the near future.

Furthermore, in the fight the Basmachi are currently entering into with the Bukhara Soviet Republic authorities, they do not always act in solidarity and, for example, beginning in '22, it is mainly the Basmachi bands of Ibrahim-Karaul-Begi and Ishan-Sultan--who, as mentioned, have advanced on Boisun--that have come from the East, while other bosses and beks, such as Daulet-Man-Vii, Maksum-Fuzail, Kurshermat, and others, have remained in their districts. Consequently, the need to unite in a common struggle with the Soviet authorities is undermined by the contradictory interests of members of various tribes of Eastern Bukhara.

III. How the Development of Basmachism Effects the Republic's Internal and External Situation

1. The undermining of the Government's authority and the reduction of its the country's food resources. 2. The relationship between the Basmachi and the Republic's foreign enemies.

Basmachi successes in Bukhara during the second half of '21 and the first months of '22 have had a very strong effect, of course, on the Republic's political and economic situation. The flourishing of the Basmachi movement has undermined the authority of the Soviet government not just in Eastern Bukhara, but throughout the entire republic. The December treachery of Usman-Khodzhaev, who had close ties with the entire Bukhara government and represented its head, undoubtedly played a certain role in this. On the other hand, we know for certain that Usman-Khodzhaev was not, in the end, able to come to terms with the Basmachi, leaving his followers unsure what to do about the situation in which their former head finds himself.

The perplexity of those segments of governing circles is profound: on one hand there is the fact that Khodzhaev committed treachery, but on the other, the Basmachi did not want to recognize him as one of their own. Khodzhaev has therefore lost his authority in Bukhara and with the Basmachi and, ultimately, among the public.

But even within the existing BNSR government, which is true to the idea of Soviet rule and friendship toward the RSFSR, Basmachi successes have caused disarray from which the Bukhara Republic will not soon recover.

Basmachi successes in Eastern Bukhara have had other political effects. On top of the approach of the Basmachi front from that half of the republic, even in the viliiats of Western Bukhara, local small Basmachi gangs are causing trouble, and the government is having to expend energy on them.

Let us turn to Basmachism's economic impact.

Due to the lack of transportation resources and poor communication with Eastern Bukhara, even before the development of Basmachism the republic was only able to collect food from Sherobod District and part of Iurchi District. With the success of the Basmachi and their advance toward Boisun, and with their increased influence in Sherobod District, the collection of food there on its present scale becomes uncertain. In a word, the Basmachi's occupation of Eastern Bukhara, the Republic's breadbasket, has had a negative effect and will probably have an even greater impact on the country's food resources in the near future.

Basmachism inevitably affects the Bukhara Republic's external situation.

The Afghan government, despite a friendship treaty signed between the adjoining states, is vigilantly following the development

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of the Basmachi movement on its neighbor's territory, and there is irrefutable proof that Afghanistan is unofficially helping the Basmachi in Eastern Bukhara. Documentary proof establishes that the Afghan government is allowing Basmachi and their accomplices into Afghanistan to buy weapons and send them up the Amu-Darya to Basmachi areas.

So far, it is hard to say what Afghanistan's objectives are here. Perhaps the Afghanis hope that supporting the Basmachi will present the former Bukhara emir an opportunity to return to power, but it is also possible that the Afghan government, after strengthening the bek movement, will offer to help the BNSR crush the Basmachi movement they themselves nurtured and will ask to be compensated with some territory in return for this service. The only thing now known is that the Afghanis have already tried to offer their services to the BNSR in this regard. In any event, the Afghan Government will not approve any plan that does not serve its own interests.

Beside the Afghanis' secretive plans, another intriguing picture came into focus when we were verifying other information. It turns out that England is also casting a favorable eye on the development of Basmachism in Bukhara and toward restoring it to "its rightful place" in the struggle of the emirate supporters and is promising the emir all sorts of assistance. The emir's followers in Eastern Bukhara have already, of course, been informed that England has such benevolent plans for them.

Most interesting of all, however, are the prospects of the Pan-Islamists, scattered across all Muslim countries. One of their leaders, Enver-Pasha, has joined forces with the Basmachi.

This third interested party interfering in the Bukhara Republic's internal affairs has already been represented by its leader for some time right in the midst of military operations and is probably dreaming of reaping the fruits of its labor exploiting the internal discord of Bukhara's people.

True, Enver at first experienced a slight mishap, and the "big man" suddenly wound up playing the role of captive of ordinary Basmachi, but they later found it was possible to release him, correctly reasoning that even in their work, "big men" can be of use.

However, given the realities of Eastern Bukhara, it can be assumed that out of all three outside forces, given a successful turn of affairs for the enemies of Soviet rule, only Afghanistan is in a position to win. England is far away for now and has "other business." Enver, due to the social diversity of the Basmachi movement, will probably be compelled to part with his temporary friends, the Basmachi, from whom in the best of cases he will receive nothing but gratitude for his personal and well-meaning instruction of the "armies of Islam."

IV. The Economic and Political Measures Needed to Stop the Basmachi Movement

1. Raising up the dehkans economically and paying them their government debt. 2. Measures of a political nature. 3. Organizational measures. 4. The need to exercise tact with the religious population and the struggle against counterrevolutionary elements.

In concluding our investigation into the reasons and conditions enabling the development of the Basmachi movement in Bukhara, especially in the East, we should outline the measures needed to eliminate this movement in the Bukhara Republic.

The most important are, of course, economic measures. In analyzing the reasons for the Basmachi's success, we saw that a wide range of dehkans who were ruined during the first two years of the revolution have been drawn into this social movement. Above we painted a picture of the ruin of these dehkans and the results of the new government's unsuccessful food policy.

To win over the dehkans who have joined the Basmachi movement politically secure the remaining peaceful toilers, the Bukhara Republic first of all must take on the goal of improving he economic wellbeing

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of this important and productive segment of its population.

We need to prove through actions that the Soviet government can do more than just "take" from the population--unsuccessfully and unfairly--and that the government is capable of satisfying in the very near future the dehkans' economic needs to the best of our ability. To this end, the government must urgently channel available supplies of basic everyday necessities toward the agricultural population to demonstrate its sociopolitical ties with them.

Information disclosed by certain members of the government at various government conferences suggests that the Bukhara Republic does have the ability to provide such goods, and the only question is how quickly they do it.

At the same time, the government must act equally decisively to halt the destruction of kishlaks and cities. Any delay in solving this problem will further aggravate the unfavorable situation the new government faces in terms of the cooling sympathies of the dehkan population.

An equally important aspect of the problem is the delay in paying the six billion debt. For a long time now, there has been a great deal of discussion about this payment within the Bukhara government, but the problem has yet to be solved. A further delay by the republic in paying its debts in money, which is quickly losing value, threatens the government in that a late payment of the six billion debt will also do little to calm the population, since people are well aware of the relative value of paper money.

By urgently implementing these economic measures  and giving the dehkans, in keeping with their everyday living conditions, the right to sell or do with the products of their labor as they see fit, while rescinding various restrictions and limitations in this area, the Soviet government will deprive the Basmachi of their most vital social foundation.

In the realm of political measures to fight Basmachism, the following steps are also long overdue.

First and foremost is the question of intensive political work among the population. As stated above, in Eastern Bukhara, which is most affected by the emergence and development of the Basmachi movement and is turning into a sort of Bukharan Vendée, the Soviet government has done exceptionally little to solidify its political influence. We see various congresses, conferences, and political meetings only in Western Bukhara, while the eastern half of the Republic is utterly ignored in this regard.

To get closer to the dehkans who have been drawn into the Basmachi movement, the Bukhara Soviet government must make every effort to frequently convene conferences and congresses with members of Eastern Bukhara's population. Only recently did the Bukhara government make an attempt in this regard, convening a conference in Boisun through a dictatorial commission, but this hastily convened conference had few attendees.

The convening of a conference must always be preceded by extensive agitation among the population, which has to be familiarized with the goals of the conference, since dehkans must view an upcoming conference not in formal terms--just the election of delegates--but more thoughtfully, and only through such organized congresses and conferences can the government test the ground for economic and political agreement with the dehkans.

To solidify their influence among the farming population, the government must also pay serious attention to the Dehkan Union, which is now very small and has poor internal cohesion.

To conduct various sorts of congresses and in general for political work among the dehkans, the Soviet government will have to pay close attention to the composition and quality of personnel sent for this purpose to the districts infected with Basmachism.

The practice of two years of revolution has shown, unfortunately, failed attempts in this regard and how difficult it is to select suitable people for such important work. We still see cases where people are not fit for their posts and even frequent betrayals of the government that has sent them. In the future, personnel sent to such critical places must be subjected

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to the party's special political oversight.

The poor training of personnel raises the question of creating a special governmental academic institution to graduate a certain cadres of individuals qualified for political work. This problem must be solved quickly , since the situation, especially in Eastern Bukhara, demands that a large number of responsible and technical personnel be expeditiously dispatched.

These measures will solve another nagging problem involved in enhancing the authority of the Soviet government on a local level. Personnel from the center who have undergone a degree of theoretical training and have studied the role of the Party will probably not commit the lawlessness of which we read countless reports in confidential chronicles from the viliiats.

The range of measures that must be urgently taken includes solving certain organizational problems. These problems are made particularly urgent by the use of Russian military forces in fighting the Basmachi.

The political situation compels us to use arms to mercilessly halt the movement of Basmachi. But for military operations to succeed, as everyone must know, military units must be given the best conditions in terms of food. Every army has to be supplied by the rear. A lack of supplies from the rear demoralizes military units and drives them to supply themselves, raising the risk of pillaging. This is all self evident, but, unfortunately, bears repeating.

The situation surrounding the supplying of Russian units by the Bukhara government is exceptionally dire. The fault for this lies with the lack of a strong and capable Soviet apparatus. The feebleness of supply agencies has yielded lamentable results for Eastern Bukhara policy and the clearing of Russian troops from this huge region, Bukhara's breadbasket, which is now at the Basmachi's sole disposal.

To avoid such mistakes and oversights in the future and improve the organizational structure of local Soviet government, we must immediately strengthen the Soviet apparatus, especially when it comes to meeting the needs of the Red Army, which has been called on to fight the Basmachi. Among the critical areas demanding an immediate solution to the organizational question are the cities Qarshi, Guzor, and Boisun.

In these areas, we must urgently do the following: 1) strengthen the quantitative and qualitative makeup of personnel in the agencies that supply Russian units; 2) improve transportation resources, which are in a lamentable state, especially in Guzor and Boisun; and 3) create a reserve supply of several months' worth of food that can only be drawn on if units are not sufficiently supplied.

To successfully fight the Basmachi and save the republic from the impending danger that these social phenomena could take even more threatening forms, these measures must be taken, we repeat, immediately. Only if these measures are carried out will Russian troops avoid the fate of supplying themselves and, without provoking discontent among the peaceful population, be able to tear the Basmachi movement up by its roots.

 

Any list of essential measures in the fight against the Basmachi must include two more important aspects of government policy.

One is the importance of being exceptionally tactful toward the religious mood of the Muslim population, and the other--seemingly contrary to the first--is the decisive battle against counterrevolutionary elements in the country.

There may be a contradiction in juxtaposing these two, a juxtaposition prompted by objective political conditions, but life has presented the Bukhara government with this contradiction and the urgent need to resolve it.

Indeed, on one hand, in the past,

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a great deal of tactlessness was allowed, perhaps because certain communists were too straightforward in how they intensified the struggle against religious prejudices among the Muslim population, and perhaps simply due to the carelessness sometimes observed in their attitude toward the faithful. In the past, such mistakes were made both by Bukharan communists and, to some extent, by Russian troops, who were sometimes compelled to use mosques for Red Army housing. In the future, an end must be put to this tactlessness, which strengthens the enemies of Soviet rule by drawing into their ranks dehkans whose faith has been insulted.

On the other, however, displays of tolerance toward the religious population should by no means weaken the struggle by the Soviet authorities against open and hidden political counterrevolutionaries. In this regard, it appears that an excess of "tolerance" toward suspect political elements,  even among Soviet officials, has exacerbated the republic's already anxious political atmosphere.

It is especially important that we fight mercilessly against counterrevolutionaries as we eliminate Basmachism while exercising, on one hand, particular tact in winning over the true toiling masses who, for reasons familiar to us, fell into Basmachi ranks. On the other, however, we must exercise total decisiveness in cutting off the deceived dehkans from all enemies and traitors to the Bukharan People's Soviet Republic.

2 April 1922

A. Nagornov.

True copy: 1st secretary of the Near East dept. [signature]

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Top Secret.

<<Stamp: R.S.F.S.R. People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Department Central Asia Section Political

20 May 1922 No. 25595/v

Moscow, Kuznetsky most, no. 5/15   Switchboard nos. : 3-32-46, 3-13-26, 3-12-09, 3-31-37, 3-33-55, 3-34-26, 3-39-27, 3-51-08, 3-40-52, 3-42-69.>>

To: Comintern Cde. Safarov

Attached please find a copy of the report from the Consul General in Bukhara, Cde. Nagorny "Basmachism in Bukhara."

Secretary P/dept. Central Asia

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