Доклад "Басмачество в Фергане". К протоколу 20 The Basmachi Movement in Fergana.

Translation

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Appendix to Prot… 13/March

The Basmachi Movement in Fergana.

The four-year military struggle against the Basmachis has not yielded positive results.

Overall Reasons

The situation in Fergana and the local population's religious practices and living conditions still have not been taken into account.

Soviet rule, in the form it took until recently, especially during the first "prodigal" years, was completely incompatible with the living conditions, worldviews, and religious beliefs of the native population.

It is specifically this that explains why the petty trader with a basket of Issyk-Kon on his head, the petty artisan, the landowning dehkan, and the nomadic herder have rebelled against us under the leadership of ulumas, ishans, and mullahs.

The Basmachis are thus a product of "Soviet manufacture."

Our Governmental Organization

The Soviet government mainly brought into Fergana railroad workers (who seemed no less alien to the local population than the former administration). The government called itself the Soviet of Worker-Dehkan's and Soldier's Deputies, but so far it doesn't include any dehkans, and there just weren't any workers and soldiers in Fergana itself, so for a long time the government remained stubbornly Russian and there was no hope of building ties with the native population at large.

The situation was saved by natives who had been mobilized during the imperialist war and returned to work in the rear after the revolution.

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As is well known, this mobilization provoked a number of revolts throughout Turkestan. But in Fergana, people refrained from this, since during the uprising of the renowned Ishan of Andijan, they bore in mind how brutally the tsarist government deals with unruliness. The population bought its way out of this mobilization: all gamblers, thieves, brigands, and idlers were bought by the population and sent to Russia, the idea being that they would never come back, and people would be pleased that they had managed to do their duty and achieve something of benefit at the same time.

After the revolution these "comrades" returned home thoroughly "cultured and enlightened," calling themselves "workers." As the only representatives of that class, they were fully eligible to join the Soviet government. These comrades were used to organize Muslim Soviets and Muslim Detachments.

The Workings of Soviet Government

That is when Soviet deputies came onto the scene and began to play a major role in the life of the local population.

Our slogans: "Down with the bourgeoisie and the old world," were immediately given real expression in the form of "Down with the bais, beat the ishans, uluma, and mullahs, tear down the mosques and madrassas. Down with God and the prophet. Long live Soviet rule."

And this was done in Fergana, where the entire way of life rested on sharia law and the Uzbek population are the most devout followers of the religious cult and fanaticism in Turkestan.

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And all madrassas and maktabs really were closed; waqfs were expropriated; qadis were arrested, but were released after they paid a certain indemnity.

The mosque in Andijan was turned into a barracks for the Muslim Detachment, which used it for batchebazstvo (raping boys).

At the same time, the underpinnings of economic life were destroyed. All production by artisans, right down to small weaving shops, were nationalized, which disrupted livelihoods in large swaths of the handicraft industry.

Finally, a ban on trade and the closing of bazaars put a definitive end to economic life in all populated areas, especially cities.

For their part, Soviet officials drank, caroused, and "took wives" almost every day, and at the weddings hosted lavish feasts (a tradition was established that every wedding had to be sprinkled with two bottles of alcohol of human height). In a single month, the chair of the Andijan Executive Committee married four different women, and his closest associate, Khaltura-Khodzhaev, married six, violating every tenet of sharia. The Muslim Detachment, or "red pants," as the population called them, openly plundered the bazaar.

All this was taking place in cities, while the kishlak population was left to its own devices; the Soviet deputies interacted with the kishlak population only in dealing with the grain monopoly, food requisition, the mobilization of horses, labor conscription, etc., areas fraught with bribes and outright theft.

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In Fergana, total anarchy reigned, and this anarchy spawned plundering, theft, banditry, and the Basmachi movement.

The Emergence of the Basmachi Movement

Here we should pause to discuss the Basmachi movement as such and its first pioneers, so to speak.

When the revolution broke out, a certain Irgash, who had been exiled for theft and murder in the tsarist era, returned to Fergana. As soon as he arrived, he organized a small gang and began to practice his profession.

We know for certain that when Kokand autonomy began, Irgash's gang was only in Fergana.

When they were setting up their government, the Kokand autonomists were primarily interested in creating an armed force. For this purpose, they granted all thieves a broad amnesty and invited them to join the national guard that had been organized. Irgash and his gang was among those invited and he was appointed kurbash of the city of Kokand.

Our Military Detachments' Initial Approaches

When Persilev laid siege to Kokand with a detachment of dehkans, to secure victory, the autonomists ceremoniously proclaimed Irgash "Khan" and gave him a green flag, asking him to defend the country from an "invasion of Bolsheviks." They sent special messengers throughout the country to appeal to the people and say that the "Bolsheviks" were taking away the freedom the revolution had given them and invite all private citizens to rise in defense of their national freedom, religion, etc.

This agitation was successful in all the areas immediately surrounding Kokand. The population, armed with axes and hoes, rushed to the aid of Kokand, besieged "by the Bolsheviks,"

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and filled the entire city.

Fighting continued for two days. Over the course of the fighting, the outcome of which had been predetermined by the technical superiority of "Bolshevik" weaponry, all the autonomists fled, and toward the end Irgash also took off, and only those who had come with axes and hoes were left, those who knew the least about what was going on. They were the main ones to suffer casualties.

Violence against the Peaceful Population

After Kokand was occupied, the detachment was given nine days for looting. The financially savvy Dashnaks decided to get rich quick, and the city was thoroughly "cleaned out."

Today, there's no such thing as miracles, but revolution topples this age-old belief at every turn. After the Dashnaks arrived in Kokand, every grocer, liquor merchant, hairdresser, butcher, those running all sorts of dens--the Armenians also proved themselves to be fervent revolutionaries, and after joining the detachment, they started to destroy the city. All the Uzbek stores were destroyed, and anything that couldn't be hauled off to warehouses was burned. The looting was accompanied by the killing of every last Muslim, regardless of sex or age. These crimes…are attested to by the remnants of burnt-down houses and signs on many buildings: "Russians live here," printed in large letters.

After these events, the people really began to believe the autonomists, that the "Bolsheviks" were rapists, atheists, and the enemies of Muslims, etc.

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After Kokand, Irgash headed 20 versts outside the city with 50 dzhigits, where he established a fortress. He lived there about nine months, and the "Soviet authorities" didn't give him a second thought and took no measures to eliminate him. There were also no measures taken against the small groups of Kokand national guardsmen that had scattered and were passing the time pillaging, hoping that the "Bolsheviks" would be driven out.

These are the conditions under which our social construction began. I have already indicated how that went.

Lack of an Organized Struggle and the Barbarity of Military Units

With the Muslim Soviet deputies rampaging; the grain monopoly; the destruction of mosques; the persecution of mullahs, ishans, and uluma; the mobilization of horses by the Soviet authorities--and with anti-Soviet agitation by autonomists and uluma--the Basmachi movement emerged in the form of individual gangs that began to grow, expand, and threaten cities and railways.

The Struggle against the Basmachi Begins

Back then, there was no unified command. Every city had its own garrison made up of armed workers and Red Army detachments. But these detachments consisted mostly of Dashnaks and all sorts of rabble.

The first operations by our detachments ended rather "successfully." After each encounter, the Basmachi detachments scattered or retreated to a kishlak and hid there.

The kishlak would be surrounded by a detachment and shot to pieces, leaving the peaceful population destroyed and exterminated. Then, when the detachment saw that the kishlak was so destroyed that there could not be a single Basmach left, it "stormed" and occupied it. Failing to find

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any Basmachi in it, since they had fled the kishlak just in time, and getting no evidence out of the victimized and embittered population, they accused the villagers of being Basmachi and executed them.

The detachments came back with plenty of booty, mostly clothing, etc.

However, this didn't stop the Basmachi; instead, they grew stronger and started to attack major cities. One of the more successful Basmachi attacks was against Andijan, where they captured 70 rifles and several thousand cartridges. The garrison, made up of those same Dashnaks, accused the entire old city of this villainy, and a garrison rally was held and it was decided to perform a search, which continued for an entire week, during which all the women had to undress and most of them were raped and robbed. After this search, almost 30,000 of the old city's young men went over to the Basmachi.

The Further Embitterment of the Sides and the Toll on the Population

But then, several days later, a detachment of Dashnaks numbering 170 was surrounded and totally destroyed by Basmachi and members of the population.

The population started to be accused of supporting and sympathizing with the Basmachi.

The Command's Recent Approach and Its Consequences

In response to the murder of 170 Dashnaks, a new detachment of 250 men was outfitted that was led by the city committee's chairman, Cde. Salaev. It attacked Kokan-Kishlak and burned it to the ground. The kishlak's fleeing population was pursued for 20 versts and totally decimated.

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A Growing Basmachi Ethnic and Religious Movement

Another detachment encountered Basmachi near the kishlak of Suzak. The Basmachi took cover there and Suzak was surrounded and showered with gunfire. The villagers fled to a riverbed, where they came under machinegun fire and were completely annihilated. Over the course of a month, their bodies were gradually dragged off by dogs.

A third detachment, headed by Konovalov--later group commander--set out for Bazar-Kurgan, where they had been led to believe they would encounter Basmachi. The detachment shot all the Uzbeks they met along the way, fearing they might report the detachment's movement to the Basmachi.

Outside Bazar-Kurgan (a kishlak) they did indeed encounter Basmachi holed up there. After withstanding a day of fighting, the Basmachi snuck away. When Konovalov left Bazar-Kurgan, he assigned a neighboring Russian settlement (Nikolskoe) to clear Bazar-Kurgan of Basmachi.

It took the peasants of Nikolskoe 23 days to "clear" Bazar-Kurgan of Basmachi. At first they looted, then they started killing, and later they simply killed everyone indiscriminately. The men were killed since they might become Basmachi in a few years. They made peace three times, and when the villagers who had scattered again came together, the peasants again attacked and again killed them. Finally, they began to invite the villagers to bury the dead bodies that were rotting and causing a stench all around.

And the last time the villagers were collecting bodies and performing their religious rites, sitting around graves, the peasants again attacked and annihilated those praying with salvos.

Presumably, the story of Bazar-Kurgan

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raised the peasant's esteem in the eyes of commanders. All the peasants were immediately armed, a peasant army headquarters was established in Jalal-Abad, and what had happened in Semirechie in 1916 began to happen in Fergana.

As a result, the entire local and respectable population, those most sensitive to insult, went over to the Basmachi.

Looking at the kurbashi's former place in society, among them we find prominent herders, such as Janabek, former district rulers, such as Arzumat, or the most influential ishan, Khodja-Muhamed, who had dozens of disciplines, etc.

The population followed them, since they were their spiritual leaders, members of the same family, and influential officials.

They waged war against "the Bolsheviks," presenting themselves to the people as defenders of religion, of family life, social traditions, etc., with the slogan "holy war" against infidels.

Their mission at the time was perfectly consistent with the situation in Fergana. This is why the Basmachi at one point became a general popular movement, political and ethno-religious.

Our Unsuccessful New Approaches and Operations

However, the armed peasant kulaks soon rebelled against Soviet rule. The Soviet authorities managed, with huge casualties, to eliminate them.

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With great effort, the Dashnak detachment managed to escape Fergana. More regular Red Army units were deployed there, and the Fergana Group's RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] devised a battle plan and carried out a series of major military operations.

Basmachi…Approaches

These operations also failed. The Basmachi would scatter rather than stand and fight. Depending on the number of fighters in a detachment, they either attacked it (if it was small) or, pretending to be peaceful, welcomed it to a kishlak, were courteous hosts, and helped the detachment with forage.

Our Red Army units, made up entirely of Europeans, could not tell the difference between Basmachi and peaceful villagers, since the only distinguishing feature, the robe and turban, were worn both by the Basmachi and ordinary Uzbeks.

The population did not <<же=не?>> betray the Basmachi, not just because they sympathized with them, but because anyone who did was brutally punished (tortured), had his ears, nose, or hands cut off, or was burned, or his close relatives were killed, etc.

The Basmachi have excellent horses (our horses barely move since they are chronically underfed), so during chance encounters, they are always able to get away from us.

The Basmachi have better intelligence than us: they learn of our detachments' intentions instantly and escape in time.

This is why all our attacks fail.

Overall, the struggle against the Basmachi has not fit into the operational plan of our military strategy.

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Our movement, the routes that have been drawn up for us in advance by group headquarters, absolutely fail to take the Basmachi into account; we never seem to find the Basmachi where they were supposed to be, and the detachment commander has to follow orders. Often we have to halt a pursuit not just because the horses or people are exhausted, but simply because there is no order to go any further.

The State of Our Units

Our units are in an exceptionally difficult position. The people and horses are hungry.

No food is taken out on operations, since there isn’t any, and they eat solely at the expense of the population, supposedly as a tax-in-kind.

The hunt for bread and forage has driven our units to rummage through trunks and outright plunder. So when they go out on an operation, our detachments encounter a universally hostile attitude from the local population.

Improvements to Our Units, Organizations, and Work

In parallel with efforts to improve military organizations and units, improvements have been made to soviet and party organizations. It has finally been recognized that eliminating the Basmachi movement will not be possible as long as it enjoys popular support. The population must be drawn away from the Basmachi. A far-reaching agitation campaign has been conducted for this purpose. Party cells have been set up, the irregularities in our high-level work have been gradually overcome, and the food policy of "squeeze and pressure" has been brought to an end, which has gradually calmed most of the population and demoralized the Basmachi ranks.

But this was not enough. It was necessary not only to draw people away from the Basmachi, but to draw

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them into direct conflict with them.

To achieve this, Muslim detachments made up of the local population began to be organized, an effort preceded by extensive political work that significantly improved relations between the locals and the Soviet authorities and marked a shift in the mood of the masses at large.

Bringing Muslim detachments made up of people sharing a common spirit and religion with the Basmachi into the fight deprived the Basmachi of their ethnic coloration and the religious motivation for the struggle.

A Change in the Basmachi Movement

As a result, the Basmachi, under pressure from the entire population, were forced into peace negotiations with us in August 1921.

They presented us with a number of conditions that could be summarized as follows:

Freedom of religion, a qadi court, the return of waqfs, a general amnesty, and acceptance of all Basmachi into the Red Army.

Our Cruel New Mistakes

These proposals were so unexpected, they sent us into a state of turmoil.

We mostly considered the Basmachi peace proposals to be a sign of their weakness. Also, we are generally people who stick to our principles, and since these proposals went against our primary communist principles, they were rejected, although each of them was entirely viable in terms of the overall situation and our operations. The main point, allowing all Basmachi units into the Red Army, which met with strong objections--even this was completely viable given the Fergana situation. All the Basmachi gangs could be stopped in those very

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areas where they are currently located, and they would be cut in half, something the Basmachi themselves were moving toward. What mattered was getting into these districts and conducting political, economic, and organizational work.

I will not dwell on this here, since we all know how these negotiations turned out.

Cde. Ioffe was the first to arrive, and he "plunged right in" to Fergana, with no idea what he was getting into. He found himself in Jalal-Abad, where he rescinded the land reform carried out in the Russian settlements to benefit the indigenous Kirgiz population, armed the peasants, and Janibek, one of the most important Kirigiz kurbashi who had come over to our side, again left us.

Janibek's departure has brought suspicion on all the Muslim detachments made up of Kirgiz, and they started to be disarmed. Some detachment members also scattered.

Earlier, one of the Basmachi's ideological leaders who came over to our side--Dzhunazakov--was shot.

Group commander Cde. Zinoviev summoned Alla-Yar, one of the Kurbashi most loyal to Soviet rule, along with 15 of his Kurbashi subordinates, tricking him into thinking it was for peace talks and treacherously killing them and burning everyone.

That put a total and irreparable end to the matter…

Nevertheless, all these negotiations and demands by the Basmachi, which were supported by the population, were taken into account by the Central Executive Committee and, after a great delay, a number of decrees settling almost all questions raised in the Basmachi demands were issued, somewhat paralyzing the negative effects of efforts by Ioffe and the command and

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enabling rather influential population groups to leave the Basmachi, which, in turn, consolidated the shift that had been achieved in the mood of most of the indigenous population.

This shift is now turning into a distinct anti-Basmachi movement. The first thing to mention is the story of the kishlak Maili-Sai, where the population fell on a Basmachi gang and destroyed them with their bare hands, handing over the 7 rifles and 32 horses that they took to commanders.

Despite our categorical request, the command has still not given the Maili-Sai villagers arms for self defense.

For several months, the old city of Kokand has been asking the authorities to create a militia to defend it, and they are even willing to pay for it.

Commanders have been categorically opposed to the idea of arming a militia, since they "could not be sure the arms wouldn't fall into the hands of the Basmachi."

This is why the residents of the old city have recently been defending themselves from nighttime Basmachi raids using rocks that had been brought in for roofing.

These rock piles can still be seen by anyone arriving in Kokand.

The fortress's garrison, which is 1000 steps from the old city, has not fired a single shot in response to cries for help. In general, it should be noted that the garrisons in all cities are absolutely passive. A verst and a half from Kokand there is a kishlak called Avganbag. The Basmachi have been occupying it every night and organizing systematic raids on the city from there.

Everyone knows about this, and nobody has done anything to stop it. On top of that, not a single military unit has left its barracks even

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when the Basmachi were moving down Kokand's main street, waiting until the Basmachi would come closer to them.

Right before the arrival of the extraordinary commission [cheka], a 150-man militia was finally organized that the city's population manned with the soundest individuals and supplied with horses. They also voluntarily took on the task of feeding them.

During its first three days, the newly organized militia destroyed 43 Basmachi, and now Kokand is utterly peaceful.

The city of Andijan, which 2 weeks earlier, as soon as it would get dark, would essentially fall under Basmachi control, now also appears to be utterly peaceful, due to the efforts of the population itself.

The population of the old city, like in Kokand, provided 100 men for the militia and 100 horses, and two hours later, as soon as the new militia was armed and mounted, it suffered three Basmachi attacks that turned into hand-to-hand combat. Three times they battled with the Basmachi and fought them off in broad daylight with crushing Basmachi losses. This is an example of the militia's fighting ability.

The Kara-Suu militia proved to be even more staunch. Over the course of its existence it lost 36 of its leading comrades, wiping out up to 150 Basmachi in the process and capturing about 80 horses. 

The Kurart militia turned in 280 rifles after being issued only 60 by commanders.

While we were in Jalal-Abad, representatives of the most remote kishlaks came to us requesting that we give them arms to organize militias, and they were willing to pay the members themselves.

As part of the overall trend toward self-defense using militias, a large upsurge of volunteers

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wanting to join militias can be observed, mostly victims of the Basmachi. Given this situation, we think that the most important role in destroying the Basmachi should be played by a workers' and peasants' militia, since, first of all, the militiamen are all local and familiar with every nook and cranny of the area, with the population, the way of life, the psychology. They know the Basmachi well and have no trouble telling them apart from the peaceful inhabitants based on their clothing, what they're carrying, etc., something no member of the Red Army can do.

I can offer a typical example. Information once came in that there was a big gang of Basmachi three versts outside Andijan.

A detachment of 70 men was immediately equipped with an armored car, a motorcycle, and two trucks. The chief of the city's militia was invited to join the operation, and he went out with the detachment along with several militiamen as guides. On the way, the detachment encountered a large number of dehkans hoeing a cotton field. The militia chief approached the detachment's commander and told him that, in his opinion, the dehkans hoeing the cotton were actually Basmachi, since they were wearing silken scarves.

The commander reproached him with cowardice and continued on.

Next, they met another group of dehkans harvesting rice. The militia chief again approached the commander and reported that he believed the dehkans harvesting rice were also Basmachi, since they were wearing trousers. The indignant commander took out a revolver and threatened that if the militia chief again approached him with such opinions, he'd shoot him on the spot.

When they entered the kishlak, the detachment encountered a group of mullahs in turbans standing outside a mosque and graciously welcoming the detachment. The militia chief again stated that the mullahs

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were Basmachi. The detachment commander started cursing and said that the coward was imagining Basmachi everywhere he looked. The militia chief insisted that the detachment was completely surrounded by Basmachi and, indeed, as soon as the detachment entered the mosque, it was met by gunfire.

When the detachment retreated, they were fired on from the mosque. The entire detachment was surrounded; everyone died and the armored car was destroyed; the motorcycle and the trucks turned back before reaching the mosque. Out of the entire detachment, only three survived.

What is typical here is that the militia chief showed great powers of observation, which is crucial in fighting the Basmachi.

Furthermore, militia members not only know individual kurbashi by name and face, they know every Basmachi, and what village they come from, whose son they are, whether they're brave or cowardly, and so forth.

With these qualities, militias are the best avant-garde for operations by our military units and will provide them with advance reconnaissance, serve as guides, and so forth.

But as matters stand in Basmachi Fergana, 100 cavalrymen equipped with two machine guns are a separate fighting force capable of independently carrying out any operation.

This force should be made up of militiamen, cheka troops, and military units headed by a commander assisted by a political officer, who has to be Muslim.

Before an operation, a detachment should be supplied with a sufficient sum to cover at least a month's expenses.

A detachment, like a guerilla force, uses its own judgment, adapting to its surroundings and the situation, and takes action against any kurbash or individual minor gangs, which it is obligated to destroy.

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The number of these guerilla detachments should be increased as needed and, as the central districts are cleared, they should move further into the interior. From there, our work will be determined by the conditions we encounter.

Our most important mission in Fergana therefore consists in organizing a powerful and effective militia.

Necessary Resources and Measures

We have everything we need for this except arms and money. For now, to the detriment of the republic's overall needs, we have to allocate monetary and material resources from available funds. As far as arms are concerned, the situation is desperate. The RVS doesn't have them, and arms can only be gotten from Moscow. I am therefore asking the Turkburo to go to the republic's RVS with a special request that it release…automatic weapons, 1,000 Mosin-Nagant rifles and an appropriate number of cartridges, 500 sabers, and 100 million rubles to arm the militias.

An equally important task for us is improving the army and its relations with the local population.

Unfortunately, until now, our Red Army troops see all Uzbeks as Basmachi, which can have dire consequences. This is because our Red Army troops have never undergone the appropriate agitation, in fact our political authorities aren't much better than the Red Army masses in this area.

The command was not able to appreciate the situation in Fergana, which was alien to it. The arming of peasants--who are utterly hostile to the local population due to their economic situation--attests to this. Information we have received

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from Uzgen District, which is filled with Russian settlements, is very alarming. Armed peasants systematically organize attacks against the Kirgiz kishlaks--supposedly on Basmachi--and pillage and murder, which has sent the population back to the Kurbashi Muiddin, who for his part assured them that…the settlements will be wiped of the face of the earth if the pillaging happens again.

According to the secretary of the Andijan Uezd and City Committee, Cde. Koshkin, the Russian settlements are filled with kulaks with 30 desiatinas of arable land each, and there are hordes of [tsarist] officers hiding among them. The overall attitude toward Soviet rule is clearly hostile.

I feel it is essential that more appropriate people be put in charge of the political departments, and the cheka charged with fighting the Basmachi should be given the powers of an RVS group.

As part of our general political effort, the commission has, in cooperation with the population itself, undertaken irrigation work involving the repair of the intake pipes in Ka..iar-Avat, for which 1 million rubles have been allocated from commission funds and a water conference for representatives of interested water consumers has been held.

The third question of colossal importance to the life of Fergana is permitting the internal circulation of goods.

Everyone knows that Fergana is distinguished by the extraordinary development of its artisan sector. There are 40,000 weavers in the city of Margilan alone.

The production of fabric is colossal. The market is filled with fabric, for which there is not much local demand. Meanwhile, Fergana is experiencing a severe seed famine.

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Permitting the internal circulation of goods within the republic will not only relieve Fergana's severe seed famine, but will alleviate the dire food situation.

My proposals can be summarized as follows:

1) Provide arms to organize effective militias made up of the local population, the number of which will be indicated separately;

2) Give the commission the authority of the Fergana Group RVS and recognize the necessity of fully providing all the group's subsistence, improving its composition, and conducting a broad agitation campaign to improve relations between our units and the local population and explaining the essence of the Basmachi movement and;

3) Permit Fergana to freely circulate goods within the Republic.