Письмо Сталину от группы партработников Туркестана Letter to Stalin from a group of party workers in Turkestan

Translation

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Top Secret

To General Secretary CC RKP(b), People’s Commissar of Nationalities, comrade Stalin.

Having been in Turkestan for more than a year and familiarized ourselves with all the manifestations of “Turkestan reality,” we consider it our duty to inform the CC RKP(b) of our judgment about Turkestan based on a special study of Turkestan, its peculiarities, current situation etc., this is especially necessary in light of analogous information in comrade Petrov’s article carried in No. 94/1533 Izvestia VTsIK of 29 April 1922.

The basis of this judgment on Turkestan Krai is the study of official policy in the East, the conduct of the local situation overall, history, the ethnography of the krai, the history of the revolutionary movement, and the foreign aspect with its characteristic features and essence, i.e. with what it was possible to become familiar with in detail and to study locally.

Due to the technical-cultural backwardness of Turkestan,

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the subjugation of this krai was completed in the [decade of the] ‘70s of the last century by a Russian imperialism that was beginning to mature and annexed it to the former Russian empire.  The large mass of the population—ignorant and downtrodden—accepted this transfer of power, especially after a number of military defeats, relatively passively.   

Only an insignificant part of the then advanced Muslims continued to foster the nationalistic aims and traditions of their Eastern despotic imperialism (absolutism).

These imperialists ended the military struggle for the Krai by the latter, engaging in a number of uprisings the largest of which were the uprisings in Fergana, of Khudoyar-Khan, of Pulat-Khan, and of Avtobacha, and a number of disturbances in Bukhara and Khorezm, etc.

After the liquidation of these actions, Turkestan despotism and imperialism

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died except for Bukhara which by agreement preserved the trappings of its system of state.

Having supported these last outbursts, nationalist circles also refrained from armed struggle and turned inward only maintaining communication with those Eastern countries where the spirit of nationalism and pan-Islamism was most alive following its birth in Egypt in the 1860s and which quickly spread among the elites of the Muslim nationalist world.

In the wake of the subjugation, Russian and Western European industrial capital began gradually to pull this inexhaustibly rich territory into the industrial stage of development, at first of a definitely predatory character.

The natural riches of the territory, however, were so great that up to the present forces have been insufficient to get hold of even one-half of the native industrial

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potentialities.  Besides a number of attendant and fundamental reasons for this, there was the ever present brake in the form of a chronic shortage of working hands.

Naturally, therefore, the territory almost completely lacks, more or less, not only a powerful proletarian nucleus, but even semi-proletarian cadres.

In regard to the preparation of public-socialist work, Turkestan was itself Terra incognita, all the more since it did not serve as a place of administrative exile.

The arrival of 1914, with its imperialist world war, also relatively little affected the territory due to its remoteness and isolation; likewise the February revolution occurred without the participation of the native population and brought to the fore a number of people by chance.  However, the February slogans gave 

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a jolt to the awakening and growth of nationalist and somewhat autonomous tendencies.

The carrying out in the territory of mobilization by force for the then Western Front around Riga played no small role, in this regard, on home-front work.

This mobilization instigated a number of mass uprisings of Muslims (for example in Samarkand oblast the battle at Dzhikaz, the disturbances in Fergana, and others).

Until this time the Turkestan Muslims had not been conscripted, but now they had to go against Germany which in their eyes was the only friend and ally of Turkey, the kindred land of Turkestan.

The nationalists played a well-known role here.

After the liquidation of these actions other complications arose that prevented the logical progress of unfolding events.

These were first, famine, and second,

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the Dutov blockade that isolated Turkestan from the metropolitan center almost simultaneously with the emergence of Soviet power in the RSFSR.

Before 1917, the former Turkestan Krai was a cotton-industrial state oasis, [but] as a result of government protectionism, compulsion, and [the pursuit] of future economic profit, sowing of cereals was reduced to nothing, replaced by cotton, and [the country] was fed with imported bread.

So it was in 1917, but the emerging food disruptions made it impossible to supply grain in the necessary quantity and the initiation of the nearly half-year Dutov blockade of Orenburg made planned food work utterly impossible.

On the other hand, the isolated territory did not have an adequate, strong proletarian nucleus, and although it advanced along the path of soviet construction

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it was unable to promote sufficient forces for this, even a minimum of prominent individual workers.

The proclamation on 13 December 1917 of Turkestan autonomy did not resolve the local situation and autonomy itself remained only a flimsy ploy.  The October revolution did not at first touch the Muslim masses directly, giving only a new push to the nationalist movement of the elites, to both the liberal-progressive segment in the person of teachers and intellectuals, and to the conservatives—ulamas, ishans, mullahs, beys etc.

But Soviet autonomy itself did not satisfy the hopes of these two groups because it was spiritually alien to them.

Lifted in January 1917 [sic], the Dutov blockade closed once again in June of the same year until 1919.  This time,

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as one would expect, was not in the least sufficient for the construction of a permanent and effective soviet apparatus.

And finally, from April 1919 to September of this year, in connection with the rule of Kolchak, a third blockade was put in place that not only isolated Turkestan from the metropolitan center, but also created a highly credible threat of English intervention in the territory.  And only since then has there been a period of relative calm.

It is obvious that during this time of cessation,  the possibilities for normal work in the territory did not come about and that “underground” currents of nationalism and even pan-Islamism succeed in fully developing and taking shape so that since 1920 regular work in the territory has already completely changed its prerevolutionary

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physiognomy and there have appeared a number of vital political groups of a nationalist character as the determining factors while up to recent times Fergana, in this regard, has played the role of the pioneer and soul of the movement.

The proclamation of an autonomous Kokand Khanate at the beginning of 1918, and the events that resulted directly from it, were the logical outcome of a peculiar local interpretation of the Soviet autonomy of Turkestan in December, and arose as an expression of the national aspirations of advanced Muslim circles, first and foremost by their ulamist and conservative element. 

Kerensky’s Constituent Assembly holdovers played a small role in these events.  Among the Muslims in the government of autonomists were representatives of almost all the Turkestan oblasts.

These events advanced into the arena

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of the political struggle for national independence a new and more concrete factor—the Basmachi—who were led at this time by one Irgash, a definite criminal type engaged by the autonomists to organize the militia and armed forces.

From this moment the growth of the Basmachi movement began, both in regard to the numerical increase of its forces and the growth of the area seized by the movement, and in relation to the consciousness of the lower classes of national ideas and the deepening of them.

The economic crisis in cotton growing played a large role in reinforcing Basmachi ranks, instantly providing it with a significant contingent of impoverished farmers.

Even the slogans of the October revolution could not find an adequate response among this uncultured, fanatically religious

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mass of the population who are psychologically alien to everything European.  The difficulty in sending reports to the center and the absence of Muslim political workers deepened the alienation of local Muslims from the leaders of the territory and the proletarian slogans of the October revolution.

Until the Kokand events, the Basmachi lacked a mass character and only with the appearance of Irgash, who united the heterogeneous groups of Basmachi just before the events, Irgash is the defender of the rights of the Kokand Khanate, they began to develop and gave a push to the growth of autonomous tendencies even among the broad masses of the population.

The crushing of the Kokand Autonomy (in mid-1918), while it inflicted a serious blow to the hopes of Muslim ideological circles, did not kill in them the desire to continue the struggle, did not annihilate

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the Basmachi, and did not end its further development.  On the contrary, in the aftermath of this rout the opponents of Soviet power appeared much strengthened because a large part of the supporters and officials of the former Kokand autonomy, given the emerging conditions, had to switch over and work for the Basmachi.

The end of 1918 and beginning of 1919 were marked by new outbursts.

The peculiar conditions of struggle with the Dutovsky and Annenkovsky’s detachments, the isolation from the center, the lack of guiding information and instructions, with a “local authority” that was sometimes short-sighted and unable to evaluate unfolding events and to take into account the local situation, gave birth to a number of partisan detachments—Koluzaev, Kolesov, Perfilyov and others—detachments that operated separately, not coordinated under a single plan or command,

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and often clashed among themselves.

These detachments were more than unfamiliar with any tactical or political approaches to the local Muslim population, valuing the kishlaks [villages] as points of supply and even of profit while the rank-and-file mass of partisans often looked on the Muslims as a lower race of people and “worked” accordingly. 

The results of such an attitude quickly became apparent and the kishlak population, exhausted by the arbitrariness and excessive requisitions of both the Reds and Whites, were filled with hatred for outsiders.

The attraction of the Basmachi began to grow stronger.  The unsuccessful SR uprising and Osipov’s mutiny combined to a degree with chauvinistic Muslim circles and brought forth a flood of skillful European anti-Soviet and autonomist Muslim forces to the headquarters

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of Medamin-Bek, then leader of the Basmachi.  Once again, Fergana oblast is becoming an arena of struggle for national independence under the slogan “Turkestan for the Turkestanis”.

The influence and connections of Medamin-Bek’s governmental union was not limited to the confines of one oblast; a number of representatives entered into relations with neighboring and kindred countries or those of a similar spirit:  Bukhara, Afghanistan, Persia, the Caucasus, etc.

As the Basmachi movement develops, this stage is characterized by tremendous [homo]geneity and the ideological intransigence of the individual leaders of major detachments, for example Kurshirmat, Mundin, Ishmat, Rakhmatkul, Aman-Palvan known as Irgash,  also manifest a definite tendency toward amalgamation of the smaller groups and the extension

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of their spheres of influence.

Medamin-Bek’s negotiations with Soviet power were taken by these ringleaders of the Basmachi movement as a betrayal by Medamin-Bek of the cause they had undertaken but, naturally, the unfortunate results of these negotiations deepened the general mistrust towards Soviet power overall.

The collapse of Medamin Bek’s governmental union (which ended with his capture and shooting by Kurshirmat) completed the second stage of the Muslim circles’ organizational struggle for their independence.  In short order the nationalists split into 2 groups and began a new struggle that still continues.  The somewhat smaller group treacherously began work in the soviet apparatuses, while the larger either stayed with the Basmachi or, concealing themselves in Soviet ranks, have begun treacherous work in the Soviet rear, disguised by their rank and bringing to naught not only all the work of the Soviet apparatus, but also neutralizing the direct military activity of the Red Army employing whatever means available.

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In the second half of 1921, the character of the movement definitely came to light.

The various commanders of the Basmachi detachments—the kurbashy—held a general congress in June where they divided spheres of influence among themselves and drew up the general propositions of the struggle and its principles; they also acted as a definite national, anti-Soviet, governmental union covertly entering negotiations with the nationalists of Bukhara, Khorezm, Afghanistan, Eastern-Chinese Turkestan, Turkey, and even Japan (The arrest in Semirechie and the trial in Tashkent in January of the embassy to Japan.).  Afghanistan took on the main role in support of the Basmachi movement, even the material part.  Eastern-Chinese Turkestan (together with the French and English consuls) recently played a role in the policy of the Basmachi when they concealed their state union, and refused [to make] peace with Soviet power, 

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advancing demands of a national-autonomous character.

On the other hand, this same Eastern Turkestan refused to extradite ataman Apnenkov to the RSFSR, and allowed the formation of new white regiments and divisions there under the command of General Shcherbakov about whichit informed the Basmachi and, in this way, gave them moral support.  The latest events in Bukhara which developed through the energetic activity of Enver-Pasha show that the Turkish nationalists are also keeping an eye on Turkestan as an arena of possible struggle with Soviet power, and the Basmachi are a ready and active force for this.

In regard to the elite of the population and, to a degree, the ordinary folk, a certain mistrust of Soviet power is now typical.  They do not believe in the policy and assurances, and consider the resolutions of the III Comintern Congress and the Congress of the People’s of the East in the sphere of national rights to self-determination a distinct deception because they see in them the basis for their nationalist bid which

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Soviet power is suppressing by force of arms.

In addition, the often inexcusable blunders and bungling, the frequent turnover in the red command, the sharp changes in tactics and methods of struggle, frequent military misfortune, concessions, and indulgences, appear in the eyes of the East as a sign of weakness, they strengthened the national appeal of the ideological segment of the Basmachi, gaining firm sympathy for it among the native population in spite of the general backwardness of the territory.

In regard to the military struggle, the wager on a peaceful transition of the rebels to the Soviet side brought the entire military campaign to naught, it strengthened all the kurbashy—their ideological element most of all; they became so strong that they raised the question of a second general congress of kurbashy which is definitely fraught with consequences given our policy’s lack of a vital line in Turkestan

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as well as given the development of the Bukhara events, the involvement of Enver-Pasha, and the extent of the Basmachi movement which has seized Fergana, Bukhara, part of Syr-Darinsky, and Samarkand oblast, and the Khorezm Republic.

Moving on to conclusions and an evaluation of future possibilities, it has to be taken into account that a Turkestan weakly connected to the Center now is increasingly losing its original connection.

Along with this, its significance as an economic base is being altered and the territory is acquiring the character of an economically isolated oasis.

The widespread famine of 1917 delivered an irreparable blow to the cotton industry and its steady contraction into 1922 resulted in the territory completely losing its significance as a cotton-producing center because it shifted to the sowing of cereal, and changed the cultivated area of land completely.  The weakening of the state apparatus contributed to this in no small way by not providing the necessary support for

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the irrigation of the territory, the struggle with pests (locusts) etc.

In regard to the grain base, Turkestan also cannot play a large role (see the fulfillment of the grain-forage requisition in the reports of Narkomprod) and has turned into an outlying region connected with the metropolitan center only by means of bank notes and the administrative structure of the government.  At the present time, we can say for certain that Turkestan, in spite of its food and raw material surpluses, cannot render full assistance even to those neighboring hungry republics closest to it since 20% is the most the territory can give.  This is the overall economic situation of the richest territory in the RSFSR, and its role is indissolubly linked with the overall political situation that, as a result of a number of alterations, began to take the clear shape of a general national movement with all its specific manifestations. 

If we sum up the four plus years of the development and deepening of the revolution, and look at

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the de facto situation avoiding tendentiousness and the overstating of future possibilities, then it is necessary to state plainly that the expected positive results from this work are now too little and not of very deep significance.  Due to a whole array of reasons and heterogeneous causes like the isolation of the territory, periodic local political bungling, the absence of a strong proletarian base and cadres, the absence of a single political line from the metropolitan center, the characteristic peculiarities of the Muslim majority, its religious distinctiveness and, to a certain degree, fanaticism, economic independence and security etc., have created a situation of a more or less currently active mass anti-Soviet mood.  The work of imperialism, both European and Eastern, from outside via Afghanistan and partly through Kashgar, Turkey, and Persia kindles this anti-Soviet mood even more, especially its most active section in the form of the Basmachi who have for 4 years already opposed Soviet power and its principles with weapons in hand.        

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For their part, the Basmachi, also as a result of a series of evolutions, accepted almost in toto the rebellious, national-liberation character, and is spilling over like a massive wave throughout the territory; from the borders of Fergana it has already enveloped Bukhara and passed through Samarkand and Syr-Darynsky oblasts and Khozrem.

Broad sympathy and support for the movement exist among the population and the formations abroad.  In itself, the military struggle is aimless and is not attaining its goals because it inflames the population even more so and the sole rational means of struggle with the rebellion—Skobelev’s tactic of 1875—now already has against it a number of arguments that do not guarantee that the goals will be attained even by attempts of this type, the time has already passed by 11/2 to2 years. 

Moving on to an evaluation of the future situation of the territory on the basis of a study of it and an analysis of events it is necessary to say that

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the situation is not favorable for the RSFSR in either the military or the economic-political spheres.  In the military sphere, in order to annihilate the main evil, of the open opposition to Soviet power with weapons in hand (of the progressive Basmachi), it is necessary to divert the military forces even more from the center and the periphery, these forces are now needed in other places.

There may occur a slowdown in the influx of this military force from the metropolitan center, it might quickly lead to a notable change in the correlation of actual forces, but each nationwide difficulty will further exacerbate the situation because it will arouse even the most passive anti-Soviet, primarily Muslim strata.  

It is not necessary to speak of Europeans since among the native local Europeans genuine supporters of Soviet power are an insignificant minority.

Carrying out Skobelev’s tactic demands an increase of forces in one place that at present cannot be permitted; but persistent work

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from across the border is inspiring even more active anti-Soviet forces, welding together their moral and cultural nationalism and pan-Islamism.  Indissolubly connected with the social situation, the economic future does not hold out the possibility to hope for any kind of successful pumping out of the tremendous surpluses and of even establishing a broad national goods exchange of a normal character.

NEP cannot give favorable results because a foundation is lacking due to widespread military activities, in addition to which its partisan character denies the chance to develop the slightest work even in the relative rear.

All the reasons enumerated above are creating the same unfavorable outlook for overall political relations, too.

Stratification has not been achieved and the chance

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of it is dwindling daily.  [Our] solid support—the semi-proletariat, the majority, and the proletariat—is worn out, weak, and is becoming even weaker, it is being sucked dry by the struggle for existence especially since NEP is not sprouting strong and healthy shoots.

Nationalism is growing and its demands are already beginning to carry a separatist-autonomous regional character with a definite reversion to mid-1917.  The policy of peacefulness and compromise is to Eastern eyes a sign weakness, and on the strength of nationalistic and fanatical religious propaganda draws into the ranks of the opponents of Soviet power even relatively inert Muslim circles.

The lack of a clear-cut, firm, and vital political line in Turkestan is resulting in it becoming an arena for an increasingly intensifying political struggle with Soviet power.

Previously the situation through Turkestan…

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further to the laborers of the East has radically changed.

Imperialism and capitalism (both local and European) having been victorious in the countries of the East adjacent to the RSFSR are now moving to the offensive, trying to tear Turkestan from the hands of Soviet power and, most important, the further sowing of the seeds of nationalism is providing an example to the remaining Muslim republics of Russia to rise up on their path of struggle, the general struggle with the RSFSR as a unified state and with the fundamental principles and ideas of Soviet power and Communism.

State nationalism, as a concrete factor, has enveloped Turkestan and the time to liquidate it has almost passed otherwise, by force of arms, it will fight for its right to an independent existence and in this way will stir up all the other Muslim Republics that are situated on the borders

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of the RSFSR as indicated by the range of symptomatic aspirations in the Muslim circles of Kirghizia and the Bashkir Republic exemplified by the former and current work among the Basmachi of such individuals as Karimov, Dzhanuzakov, Faizullin-Batirshin, Validov and others, these leaders of their nationalities; otherwise it must enter the arena of political life as a friendly state quantity and, in which case, now refrain, if possible, from armed struggle with it and its offspring, the Basmachi.

Without prejudging the question of whether nationalism will retain power, it must be said that there are direct gains for the RSFSR in the form of reciprocal results.  The fall of nationalism is a natural stage in the establishment of the socialist foundation, its existence is an evolutionary stage in the general development of the East, a policy line that

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sooner or later must rectify itself in connection with the general situation and policy of the RSFSR on a world scale.

Moscow

9 May 1922

Group plenipotentiary [signature]