Отчет заседания Средазбюро о межэтнических противоречиях в Хорезмской республике

Translation

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Transcript

Meeting of the Central Asian Bureau of the CC of the RKP, 13 April 1924 at 6 p.m.

The meeting is opened by Cde. Karklin, and during Cde. Karklin’s report the chairman’s seat is occupied by Cde. Rakhimbaev.

Cde. Karklin: Comrades, I would like to discuss in brief the overall state of the situation in the Khorezm Republic at this point. It must be said that in the last half of March and the first half of April in Khorezm there has been a decisive turnaround in events, which have been going on since January in Khorezm in one way or another. The turnaround has to do with the fact that basmachi have been surrendering more intensively, which had not been noticeable before; with the surrender of Agadzhi Ishan and his son Maksum and two other kurbashi [field commanders], we can assume that this area has been cleansed of basmachi and that further military operations are not required there; the same may be said of Turkmen Raion—things have settled down there, too.

As for the operations against Dzhunaid Khan himself, they have been under way for almost a month already in the stands, not in the cultivated section of the oasis. Our regiment, the Fourth I think, which was operating against Dzhunaid-Khan, was 200 versts from the cultivated zone; so the latest decisive clashes, which were in February, dealt a decisive blow to Dzhunaid. After that there were only small skirmishes. At this point we can say for certain that military operations in the Khorezm Republic are over. Measures of a combined nature are needed, which we will talk about afterward and the representatives of the military ministry who are present will supplement us in this regard.

As for economic and Soviet construction, it must be said that the situation in this regard is very, very gloomy. The Khorezm government is not able

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to undertake any measures in this regard not because they are not feasible financially but because there are no personnel who can carry out this construction. For example, I will cite the distribution of agricultural loans. The Agricultural Bank in Novy Urgench has had 300,000 rubles at its disposal for a whole month already, but it cannot be allocated among the population because there is no staff that can handle this matter. Agricultural partnerships have only been organized in the area adjoining Novy Urgench, 10 partnerships have been set up there, but if one adds the partnerships that have been organized in Amu-Daria Oblast totaling 21, they will need 200,000 rubles a year, according to the branch manager. It is clear that the entire requirement can be covered in full with the funds available there. On top of that, the granting of loans is hampered terribly by the formalities on which the issuance of loans to dehkans is conditioned. I don’t think this procedure for issuing loans can be sustained, since it is, according to conversations with comrades, so complicated that dehkans who want to get loans may starve to death before they get the money, so unless these formalities are simplified and if the same procedure for issuing loans as in the gubernias of the Center continues, the money will lie around for no purpose. In this regard I have already reported by telegraph from Khiva to Cde. Mezhlauk, i.e. to instruct the Agricultural Bank to simplify the current procedure for distributing money. I must state that the situation at the branch is so lousy that there is not even a single copy of the charter of the credit partnerships, so if anybody wishes to take a look at the charter, they cannot get it. True, the Bank Branch is supposedly not yet open, but there are already employees, and a fairly substantial amount of the 300,000 rubles is already being spent on them, so it turns out that we are maintaining what is only a well-known staff, and there is money in the cash office, it is being used to pay employees, while the dehkans are watching the employees receive money. That is the situation in Khorezm regarding the issuance of agricultural loans. Some measures should be taken

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to settle accounts with the populace for supplying the Red Army, no matter what form it takes, since forage and transport and so on and so forth were collected there. Some funds for this have already been released and have been paid out in one way or another, but that is not enough, and if examples are to be cited as to what the debt to the populace was paid for and in what amount, I will say that, for example, the operation involving Dzhunaid-Khan required camel transport in a quantity of 2,000-plus camels; I agree that while our detachments were operating, camel transport was needed, but if it is available now, then it is necessary, at the very least, to pay for it. If we do not have enough funds for this, we could do this: Gostorg [State Export-Import Office] has fabrics in Khiva amounting to about 1.5 million rubles that are in warehouses. These fabrics were purchased by the old government before the Fourth Kurultai [Assembly]. And it turns out that a large quantity of them are usable in Moscow or somewhere abroad, but they are too “good” for Khiva. So maybe these fabrics could be turned into money, which could be used to cover the debt to the populace, we tried to frame this question in this form with the CC of the Communist Party of Turkestan several times, but even though this question was raised several times by Cde. Adinaev and others, this question kept getting dropped from discussion, there is some reluctance to touch this fund, so I think it must be decided today how the payment is to be made.

As for Khorezm’s Soviet administration itself, if we say that it does not exist at a local level, we must acknowledge that it is almost nonexistent in the center as well. You can issue all the nice resolutions you want, but there are no suitable functionaries or the appropriate body to implement there. For example, there is a resolution by the Executive Bureau reducing the State Administration, and we should point out that before we were there 80% of all state revenue was spent on paying employees, while only 20% was left for other needs. On 10 March a resolution was issued

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reducing the staff of employees, but until we arrived it all remained on paper. Taking into account this abnormal situation, we put at the head of the commission Tursun Khodzhaev, who immediately got down to work and cut the whole staff by 60%. You can see from this how resolutions are implemented. Of course, the cutback will bring about some appreciable results. In general I must say that, as I traveled around this little country, I did not see anywhere even a remote semblance of our new construction, I have a feeling of the most faraway Middle Ages everywhere; naturally this is very sad. I could cite a whole host of examples to support this, but I will cite only a couple. In this very city of Khodzheili, the garrison commander, for example, orders the execution of someone, the head is chopped off and impaled on a stake and it sits there for three days before the populace in the center of the city. Until recently all cases that came up against insurgents, or regarding other offenses, were sorted out in the GPU, in closed meetings, because there was no court, there was a Revolutionary Tribunal, but it was not operational, so the cases would be sorted out either in the office of the GPU Chairman or more serious cases would be taken up by a three-member Collegium. In 1918 this was a necessity, but this necessity does not yet exist in Khorezm. When we asked how many people are in prison, the answer we got was that supposedly only 80 people are locked up; yet when we created a commission to examine this question, it turned out that Khiva’s prisons were holding 300 people, of whom 200 people have no idea what they were arrested for, even their names were not known, they were just locked up. We created the commission, pushed it through the Executive Bureau and assigned it to inspect the prisons and release people who had no specific charges against them, and as a result 200 people were released already while we were in Khorezm because it was difficult to establish exactly what they were arrested for.

Then, during the uprising, a lot of different property, entire shops and specific household items were confiscated from the population, without any basis and for no known reason. We received hundreds of complaints; regarding many of them that we checked on, we were able to establish that a horse was taken from one person, a rug from another person, etc. We were able to return some things, but not other things. But there are many such abominations. Before we left, we created an Extraordinary Session, which was to hold, above all, government representatives to account for abuses, and they will have to be tried first. A few days ago I received a telegram from Cde. Broido, who is in Khorezm, to the effect that another 80 people were released, so only 28 people against whom there is any evidence were still in prison.

As a result, while we were in Khorezm we somewhat rectified major errors made by the local authorities.

The next sore problem in Khorezm is the question of nationality relations. I have never before seen frictions manifested in as sharp a form as they are there. If, for example, an Uzbek appears on horseback in Tashauz Raion, one can be sure that the horse will be taken away from him, he himself will get a beating, etc.; the same thing applies if a Turkmen woman appears in Khodzheili , she is insulted in every conceivable way, only because she appeared among Kirgiz; the same attitudes prevail against Turkmens in Uzbek areas and they are expressed everywhere in concrete actions. People in Khorezm view Tatars very badly, no matter who they are, party members or otherwise, if somebody is a Tatar then he is a translator, that is what they say. I must say that this is an unhealthy phenomenon. On the other hand it must be said that the Tatars everywhere seek to occupy a dominant position. We talked a great deal about this and decided to form autonomous oblasts: the Kirgiz and Turkmen oblasts. I must say that if one takes the ethnic arithmetic as a basis, Turkmen until now have been represented everywhere in very small numbers; for example, if we take the party, we see that out of 600 members there are only three Turkmens, in fact one was even challenged with the claim that he was not a member but a candidate member.

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The Komsomol, which has a thousand-plus members, also has few Turkmens, it even has more Russians than Turkmens; the same turns out to be the case in the central government bodies. When we began setting up the Presidium of the Khorezm CEC, it turned out that we had to bring in a comrade from outside in order for there to be a Turkmen representative. The Turkmens say with good reason that it is an Uzbek government.

Now, of course, these nationality relations have become much worse not only between the Turkmens and Uzbeks, no they are lousy everywhere and the same holds between the Kirgiz; they say there, for example, when the question came up of moving the capital of Khiva to the so-called “industrial center,” Novy Urgench (we rescinded this resolution), that the secretary of the KCP [Khorezm Communist Party] was a Kirgiz and that he was first moving the capital of Khiva to Novy Urgench, and then would migrate across the river and the capital of Khiva would end up in Turtkul. The water question is serious, since the Uzbeks in this respect are in a more advantageous position than the Turkmens, water questions have been a subject of ancient quarrels, they are a fundamental source of enmity, and if the actions that I will announce achieve something, we will see tensions ease to a certain extent.

Then there is also the question of the blood feuds among the Turkmens themselves. It must be said that these blood feuds have been maintained, and are maintained to this day, by many people unconsciously and consciously, and yet they think that our policy is correct. After all, the blood feuds have existed for a long time, and they have caused the bloodiest events, such as in 1920 when due to a blood feud Shamamedov was killed and together with him a lot of Turkmens, yet not much has changed since then. Before the Fourth Kurultai the old government had friendly and hostile clans, and the same is true now—we see the same phenomenon. Take, for example, Dzhunaid Khan’s clan—all of it seemed to be antagonistic to the existing government, it suffered all kinds of punishments, while Niyaz Bakshi’s clan was friendly, it received honors, awards, etc., members of his clan work in the GPU, they provide summaries and so forth, whereas Guliam Ali’s clan

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for some reason does not have these honors; in my view this is wrong—and the clans of Yakshi Geldy, Niyaz Bakshi and Guliam Ali are no worse one than the other. People say that a hostile clan has a connection with Dzhunaid and things like that. I would like to note especially in the presence of the Revolutionary Military Council that a lot of information is false and incorrect and it is received for this reason: representatives of the clan who work in the GPU and our other intelligence agencies, they are from clans friendly to us, and they frequently provide information that denigrates another clan. For example, during the January events Guliam himself was not here, he was in Persia, but there were people from his clan who were fighting against us because we were unable to reach an agreement with them, and if we had been fairer, this would not have been the case, and their behavior would have been completely neutral, if not friendly. I think we need to frame the matter so that there are no subdivisions and all the commanders of clans are equally friendly to us. I received a letter today from a comrade who writes the following: (reads excerpt from letter).

This is the view that has existed up until now, namely that we are dealing with friendly and hostile tribes, and on the basis of this opinion some comrades believe that Dzhunaid Khan’s entire tribe is hostile to us and that it must be completely annihilated. But after all, many, in essence, are absolutely peaceful people who do not fight and are quite friendly to us, they are not against us, and in many cases they themselves turn against Dzhunaid, and there are a lot of examples of this. We have tried to bring definite clarity to this matter and to establish a line of conduct such that our relations with everybody are the same. Of course, we cannot be friends with Dzhunaid Khan, but with the others we are the same, if we promote someone to a post of honor, bestow an award and so forth, we do it for everyone else as well. If we promote someone from one tribe to administrative posts, we need to arrange things so that others get the same kind of promotion, if we bestow an award on someone from one

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tribe, then we do so for the others as well; if we form a militia, then it must be calculated so that there is an equal number from each tribe, so that all of them are placed equally: those who work in the military, in the GPU, and so on and so forth.

I had—Cde. Pugachev, I think, was present—when Kutiakov said that Guliam Ali should be wiped off the face of the earth, I responded to him that in that event you will no longer be fighting against Guliam Ali’s 600 men, but women and children and old people as well will rise up and march against you.

That is approximately the line of conduct in relations with local tribes and clans, and it needs to be followed. There is no formalized party organization either in Turkmenia or in other areas. This can be attributed to the fact, of course, on the one hand, that since the beginning of January all of the party comrades have been deployed to liquidate the front that was created, that was the task on which the party focused all of its resources. The Komsomol has about 1,000 members, but it is hard to say exactly, since the work is not being done poorly, but in any case the organization of Komsomol members is the most advanced and liveliest, and all of the major posts in the government are held by Komsomol members. There are also old comrades in the Komsomol who are Komsomol members, for example Adinaev, he is 27 years old and he is a Komsomol member. A certain viewpoint has also taken shape regarding the Komsomol, such that if some important matter must be resolved, then the tendency is, what will the Komsomol members say and many matters are resolved from this perspective: but we must be fair and point out that the Komsomol members have indeed been heroic during the revolt, they know how to fight. They protected themselves, defended themselves and fought exactly the way a Communist should fight. Considering all of their contributions and the overall situation in Khorezm, our approach to the Komsomol organization should be especially tactful, and if we fail to take account of specific local characteristics and if we simply say that they must be purged and we will only be critical of them, we will lose any healthy connection, and given the current situation in Khorezm that means that we will have to get involved there with the beys and priests. In general the political situation in

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Khorezm is of such a peculiar tint that for example Nizam Khodzhaev, who is regarded here as one of the “leftist” Communists, he has turned so far to the right there that he made the Komsomol members angry. That is why I say that the approach to these matters must be very, very cautious and attentive. Even a leftist like Nizam Khodzhaev has turned into a rightist, so if we send comrades there from here, they must be the kind who know how to precisely gauge the situation and so that they can lead but do not know how.

In closing I will say a few more words about the revolt itself, about how it occurred. I must say definitely here that if the Khorezm authorities had acted differently at the time, there would not have been any revolt. Maybe some comrades do not know how it began.

On 13 January about a thousand people gathered and went to seek justice and assistance from the government. They walked 70 versts to Khiva. They were not allowed into the fortress, and a delegation was appointed, which was allowed into Khiva. What is remarkable is that their distrust of the government was so great that they did not go to its representatives but went to the Plenipotentiary Representative’s Office. The first delegation was unable to reach an agreement, so they sent another one. The Khorezm Government put this second delegation in prison; a thousand people were standing behind the walls of Khiva waiting for a response, and before they got one they sent a second [sic] delegation numbering 100 people, which was also arrested. After this the whole crowd went back and began to arm themselves, old people, children, everyone who could. The demands they made to the government mostly had to do with lowering the tax, and if the tax was not lowered, then to wait until autumn. What the government should have done is go and see for itself at a local level how valid and legitimate the requests of the people who had come to it were, or to meet them halfway, but this was not done. I should also add to this that everyone who was

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ousted from the government by the Fourth Kurultai conducted intensive agitation against the current government.

Now a few more words about Cde. Broido’s commission. We were in Khiva from 16 March to 4 April waited there for the commission, which was supposed to come from Moscow. I didn’t know that it had been decided to send Broido and Sedov to Khiva and that Asfendiarov had been included in the Commission. They arrived on the 31st, and I stayed until the 4th; the conference opened on the 1st, and a number of questions were raised at it. I don’t have the resolutions with me since the conference had not yet ended. I must say that while I was in Khorezm close contact was established with the commission and local authorities and the work was set up. We arranged that the commission would communicate with us on a direct line so that we can let it know of the decisions that are agreed on here. When the commission arrives, a report will be made to it.

Now as to certain comrades who should be transferred and changed, such as Cde. Gorodetsky, but I would suggest that this matter not be decided until the commission arrives.

With this, I can close.

The proposals I am submitting, they have all been sent out and so I will not read them.

Responses. A few more words about the tax. Taxes in Khorezm have been collected in a chaotic fashion, there have been no rules in this regard, and the agricultural tax was cut by 50%. I must say, all the same, that during our stay a number of resolutions were issued regarding this matter, but the resolutions are hard to get passed. I have asked the Secretary of the CC to transmit instructions again by telegraph on a tax cut and assign the responsibility for it to the secretaries of oblast committees.