Доклад Иоффе о положении в Туркестане A. Ioffe's Report on the situation in Turkestan

Translation

<<l.1>>

Report No. 2

Append... No. 1

1 Nov.(V. Mi...)[To Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov]

To Cde. Molotov

S…

8 Nov.  (V. Mi..)

V… Report No. 1…

3 Nov. (…

To Cde. Stalin

For a decision

3 Nov. (V. Mi…)

To be returned! 

Stalin 

<<l.2>>

Soviet government agents in general and members of the ComParty in particular have been using and continue to use these "reforms" to arrange all sorts of private profitable deals and have been settling and continue to settle all sorts of private scores on a grand scale. If I might be permitted a small digression, I would like to take the opportunity to comment that it wouldn't be a bad idea at all to send a special inspection commission to Turkestan--a serious, responsible, and authoritative one--since in almost every agency here huge sums have been disappearing without a trace, and since the Turkestan Communist Party is worthless, and there's also no true ComParty here, the people's wealth will continue to be plundered and to disappear.

Returning to the subject of my report, I must say that even in Tashkent I was getting all sorts of complaints alleging various abuses committed in the course of "land utilization reform." And these complaints were not just from victims, but from comrades, true communists, who could not endure the local atmosphere and fled Turkestan. Some of these complaints I personally looked into on site, and some, most of them, could be addressed by the inspection commission mentioned above that should be sent from Moscow.

But the most important question, of course, is not the abuses that have accompanied and continue to accompany the implementation of  the "land utilization reform," but the reforms themselves.

Although a lot of bungling is going on in Semirechie as well, you don't get nearly the awful impression there that you get from the Dzhelialabad [Jalal-Abad] area, which I wrote about in my last report.

First of all, the size of Semirechie, which is as big as the three Balkan states combined, is so great that it simply hasn't been possible in such a short time to ruin, bankrupt, and destroy as much there as in the relatively small area of Dzhelialabad, and second, of course, Safarev is smarter than his followers, and in

<<l.3>>

Semirechie evidently the main land utilization work was done by him himself, and third, finally, and this is most important, all mistakes in Semirechie, you could say, are canceled out by the unprecedented, unheard of, absolutely amazing upsurge of the Kirgiz masses. I have seen many revolutionary upsurges and I also remember the pre-October mood of the Petersburg workers, but I've never seen anything like the mood among the masses…and Semirechie. I was in nomad aulsand kishlaks (…) of settled Kirgiz…since news that "a representative of Lenin" had arrived  spread at a magical speed and always preceded us (I was ecstatically greeted by crowds of the most genuine Kirgiz people; everywhere, after rallies, I gathered the local authorities and "the people's" elected representatives and talked with them; everywhere…me for…needs and, although strictly speaking, in essence…the government has given the poor almost nothing, and...petitions, due to the fact that I could not satisfy them, were turned down--everywhere…and with the same ecstatic mood I would…ecstasy, reverence for Soviet power and in particular for Cde. Lenin,…As a sample I am appending a translation of a paper that came with gifts from the Kirgiz poor intended for Lenin, Trotsky and me. The original, together with the gifts, I will bring for a museum that should be created by the Peop…

This mood of the Kirgiz poor in Semirechie, which is unlike anything in any of the other oblasts I have visited in Turkestan, is the first and strongest impression of Semirechie, an impression that overshadows even the horrors of economic devastation, the perils of ethnic…and hostility and the groans and grumbles of offended (sometimes recklessly and stupidly offended) Russian peasants.

But at the same time, this very mood obscures…dangers for the future.

<<l.4>>

The liberation movement of downtrodden nationalities always carries a nationalist flag, not just a national one. Suffice it to recall as a striking example...the separatist tendencies in Russia during the Kerensky era that threatened to dismember Russia into a number of ethnic states. Through the creation...and timely...ethnic movement...class...we dealt with these dangers. Whether or not Turkestan will manage this is a big question, since for now Turkestan policy is serving to promote a nationalist consciousness, rather than class consciousness. The masses overall have, apparently, been only weakly infected with the nationalistic contagion, but within ethnic intelligentsia circles (which call themselves communist), this disease is already far advanced and within the Kirgiz environment hostility and rivalry has already begun, even between... -Kirgiz and Kirgiz (Kazakhs). This is the first danger, a serious one, and it deserves the greatest attention.

The second danger is that such an ecstatic mood among the Kirgiz poor at a time when almost no attention is being paid to their economic needs cannot last for long. And if that mood changes, then faith in the Soviet government will collapse along with everything that is valuable in this Kirgiz movement. The foundation of economic wellbeing in Semirechie is, without question--and, perhaps, should continue to be for a long time--the Russian peasantry. But since Russian agriculture will be systematically destroyed, it is doubtful that the Kirgiz poor's economic quality of life will seriously improve. Then the Kirgiz poor will grow disappointed in the Soviet government and everything will fall apart. This is the second danger, and it deserves even more serious attention.

In order to understand both dangers, it is important to take a closer look at the land utilization reform, how it is being carried out and how it should be carried out.

The Land Utilization Reform.

A small excursion into the past is needed here. The tsarist government saw Semirechie as nothing but

<<l.5>>

a colony and only approached it from the colonizer standpoint. At first (Siberian) Cossacks were settled in Semirechie and given 30 desiatina per capita allotments. When Cossacks proved to be unsuitable colonizers, they started to colonize by resettling Great Russian and Ukrainian peasants, who at first also received the same 30 desiatina  per capita allotments, which later was replaced with a 10 desiatina one, since such large allotments were left unplowed on the one hand, and, on the other, there soon was not enough land to go around, since in Turkestan land always depends on water. But in parallel with this process of planned colonization of the area there was also a spontaneous process of...and settlement on peasant land from hungry central provinces. The tsarist government sometimes...Semirechie for resettlement, and sometimes again permitted it. There was no system whatsoever, except for the fact that the Cossacks and settlers were given the best land without any regard for the interests and needs of the native Kirgiz population. Finally, after the hungry year of 1891 and a particularly large influx of settlers from the center, the tsarist government was forced to somehow sm…h relations between the natives and arriving...settlers. The so-called "Steppe Statute" was issued, rather vaguely establishing certain regulations governing both land utilization and daily life. Based on this Steppe Statute, Kirgiz lands were declared state property, but at the same time, areas of land utilization were limited. All told, ...4,198,520 desiatinas were taken away from Kirgiz nomads and they and Kirgiz semi-nomads were left with 27,159,316 desiatinas.

The vague Steppe Statute could not, of course,

<<l.6>>

fundamentally change the Kirgiz's basic life circumstances, and their land utilization continued to be governed both by their old customs and the new needs of economic life. Meanwhile, both the Russian settlers and local authorities were extremely easily bought and, of course, paid little heed to the Statute. When there wasn't enough land for the new settlers, the government removed new lands were removed from use by the Kirgiz, or the settlers, with the help of the "local authorities," "leased" the Kirgiz lands from them.

According to statistics, on average Russians were planting no more than 10–15 desiatinas per capita, which, given less than 21% Russians, would not have been felt by Kirgiz agriculture. But I suspect that the statistics do not take into account where specifically the Russians were planting their 10–15 desiatinas (not to mention the fact that there were, of course, some who planted 100 desiatinas). Farming in Semirechie is of the most predatory sort, so-called fallow-land farming: the peasant keeps sowing until the land stops yielding, and then he abandons it and begins to plant somewhere else. The average Russian peasant with a per capita allotment of 10 des. who has planted up to 15, after exhausting his land, simply took, wherever he wanted, new land and planted it. Under these conditions, the average planting of 10–15 desiatinas began to greatly affect Kirgiz farming, all the more so as, while in the past the law was upheld and land was not just grabbed by Russians but was leased to them, these operations were carried out by local Kirgiz manaps (small-time feudal lords) without the knowledge of even the Kirgiz masses. Evidence for this can be found, first of all, in the large number of so-called "zaimki" [squatters' settlements]--small farmsteads owned by Russian peasants with their own manor houses in the settlement and their own allotments, and second, in that many peasants who had an allotment…were not affected by the land-utilization reform of the last period, they told me. Since it...was not permitted to plow

<<l.7>>

"available" (read: Kirgiz) land, they were supposed to starve, since there was no point planting their own lands: "it's like throwing seeds into the earth for nothing." Using this system for working the best lands--new lands every time--with a minimum expenditure of labor, the Russian population prospered. The Kirgiz, meanwhile, were dying off. Their situation became particularly bad in recent years. Brought to desperation by the constant grabbing of their lands, the Kirgiz revolted, provoked by the 1916 announcement of universal conscription for work on the home front. The revolt took on vast proportions and was cruel...suppressed. The year 1917 was a hungry one, and the Kirgiz were dropping like flies and not only sold all their belongings but their wives and children as well. Finally, in 1918–1919, the local Soviet government was essentially a government of local kulaks--colonizers, who legally and actually solidified the plundering of the Kirgiz by the Russians, still...but strengthening it.

Under these circumstances, the mere proclamation...Kirgiz with the Russians was enough to win over...the former. But since the...Soviet government that had been established in Turkestan was in reality Kirgiz power--probably largely of a group, Safarov nature, and then primarily that the native intelligentsia is largely Kirgiz, trust in the new government on the part of the Kirgiz masses only increased. Although that doesn't stop the raging to an insignificant extent of the Kirgiz Basmachi, but, on one hand, the specific conditions in Fergana have a strong influence here and, one the other, the Kirgiz Basmachi movement is quite small compared with the Uzbek one, and in Semirechie it doesn't exist at all. Instead, the Kirgiz can't wait to get their hands on the Basmachi.

Clearly, in this situation, the only conclusion young and inexperienced comrades could draw was that in the interests of winning the sympathies... , it was necessary first and foremost to punish everyone who had injured the Kirgiz and right 

<<l.8>>

the wrongs perpetrated against them. Therefore, in addition to the necessary and correct declaration of equal rights (political and economic) of all nationalities, a campaign was also launched against Russian peasants, who were all proclaimed to be colonizers and oppressors. Since it wasn't possible to punish all Russian peasants in Semirechie, of whom there were, after all, more than 300,000, they began to look for "scapegoats," to fabricate "kulaks," who had their property expropriated, were arrested, exiled, and even shot. Those punished, for the most part, were randomly taken from the general mass, since the goal was certainly not to punish the guilty, but to give the Kirgiz a vivid lesson on the new government's new attitude toward them and the opposite lesson for the Russian colonizers. At this point, Russians across the region let out a moan and began to turn against the Turkestan Commission, which was besieged by victims, and began, as Safarov put it, to tweak kulak noses. The matter took on an ethnic coloration, and in reality led to an exacerbation of ethnic enmity on both sides among the intelligentsia and particularly among communists.

Since there was absolutely no preparation for the land utilization reforms, nobody even knew what was available to work with and the entire reform was conducted exclusively from an agitation standpoint--young administrators, having lost sight of the economic aspect of the question, didn't realize that the economic devastation of an already rather devastated krai would hit the weakest economic classes hardest of all, that is, the Kirgiz poor themselves. 

Officially, the land utilization reform was supposed to consist in expulsions from the unpermitted settlements organized since 1916 and the settlement of the Kirgiz poor there, and also in the elimination of contentiously located settlements (those sitting on head irrigation ditches or on cattle-driving paths). In the heat of the moment, of course, people got carried away in some locales and used a heavy hand to do away with much more.

The order was to expel all unauthorized settlers within two weeks,

<<l.9>>

and provide them a new place to live later in the week. The first was easy and was quickly carried out. The second was not so simple, and therefore even now has not been done. There was no preparation, there are nothing to work with, everywhere you looked it turned out that, despite...assumptions without any basis whatsoever, in...settlements there was no place.  And since there was no registry of the land and nobody knows how much and where it is, finding a place for those expelled isn't working out and in many districts the Russian peasantry is living in such crowded conditions that each individual gets an average of 1/4...Worst of all is that, since it was primarily unauthorized settlements that were expelled, in other words young villages that hadn't really gotten established enough yet, so all this, if I may, "re...rm" has hit the poor hardest.

Even worse than...the Russians, the situation is hard for...the Taranchi, who were robbed and ki...by the hundreds in 1918–1919 and for whom nothing has been done yet.

As far as the Kirgiz themselves are concerned, relocated to Russian settlements, unaccustomed to Russian farming conditions, and left without any guidance and instruction, they...let the farms deteriorate and continue to die of hunger. They took very little account of agricultural practicalities, and quite often divided up land among labor artels, giving plow-land to those experienced in farming kitchen gardens, while former batraks [farm hands], who knew how to plow but did not know anything about kitchen gardens or gardening, were given gardens and small plots.

Equipment and livestock were also supplied...slipshod, and some got a lot while others got little; finally, hastily put together artels often are just an assemblage of shady characters into which real kulaks also worked their way in order to...property.

Those are the facts. When they were noticed, a lot of people went to the opposite extreme. Since by this time, people in Turkestan had learned of the so-called "new economic policy," in many places they decided to return owners 

<<l.10>>

confiscated immovable and moveable property that was taken from them. I myself have witnessed gardens and inventory being returned to their owners.

All of this, as I indicated above, has mostly led to an increase in chauvinistic moods in both camps, Russian and Kirgiz, especially as the reform itself has been conducted with savage terror and demonstrative, nightmarish beatings of Russians in the presence of Kirgiz and orders to the latter to beat the former (according to some complaints, Safarov himself has taken part in these beatings; the pertinent materials have been sent from here to the CC and CCC). Secondly, this has brought serious economic devastation, since the basis for the region's wellbeing--farming and cattle breeding--is being permanently destroyed. While in 1915 a total, in round numbers, of approximately 640,000 desiatinas were planted and there were approximately 92,000,000 head of cattle, by 1920 the corresponding figures for planting were approximately 300,000, and for cattle, approximately 2.6 million head. A catastrophic decline! And although local administrators are proud of the fact that in 1921--they claim as a result of the land utilization reform--area planted increased to 436,000 desiatinas, this improvement was illusory, since the yield per desiatina was cut in half, due to all the perturbations of reform, and thus, based on the present, we can conclude that the cultivated area has been reduced in comparison even with 1920.

General Conclusions

As a result of the land utilization policy in Semirechie, ethnic discord and hostility have been growing and the region's economy is being destroyed. Both are exceptionally important and dangerous. Ethnic self-awareness, which even under normal circumstances is developing at a pace the class education of the masses cannot match, is furthermore being fueled by an ineptly conducted policy that may lead to the lamentable development of separatist strivings. 

Economic ruin is even more dangerous, since, speaking now about orders from the center, the rest of Turkestan is placing on Semirechie 

<<l.11>>

exceptionally serious economic demands that under normal circumstances are presented using figures from statistical data such as:

1) Demand for grain reaching 30,000,000 poods [1 pood=36 pounds].

2) Demand for livestock and meat reaching 700,000 poods. 

It is believed that, under normal circumstances, Semirechie can meet these demands (and even others), but if we consider the fact that now, at best, Semirechie is expected to deliver 2,000,000 poods of grain this year, it becomes clear how devastated the region is. And the question of Turkestan's cotton industry, incidentally, depends entirely on Semirechie satisfying the needs of the rest of Turkestan! At the same time, it is indisputable that Semirechie, in terms of its natural wealth in the areas of agriculture and livestock breeding, can easily triple even its prewar production. Consequently, there is a great deal riding on what is done in Semirechie and how.

These economic questions are of exceptional political importance, since a hungry Muslim Soviet republic cannot be considered a model and can never have the significance in our international policy that has fallen to Turkestan's lot.

Up to now, we have only been able to raise the revolutionary and, so to speak, "soviet" mood of the Kirgiz poor. But we have so far given the poor almost nothing, while we've turned the Russians against us and are facing the danger of a progressive mood among the Kirgiz poor that is not in our favor.

At present, the Kirgiz nomad or semi-nomad who has been cheated out of his share of livestock is trying to settle down on land. They are being offered this opportunity through the expulsion of unauthorized Russian settlers. But that land won't be enough and already isn't enough, and since there hasn't been an accounting of either the water or the land in Semirechie, in the same way they don't know where to put the expelled Russians, soon they won't know where to put the Kirgiz demanding land. Furthermore, it's not enough to just give land; settlers have to be supplied with livestock and equipment. While during the prerevolutionary period equipping a new peasant farmstead required capital of approximately

<<l.12>>

1,000 rubles, now it is much more. True, it is mostly artels...on the land, and under collective agriculture we can greatly reduce this figure, but there's no way we'll satisfy everyone.

Specific Proposals

Based on everything I have described, I proposed when I was in the region and I will propose here, in the center, and I am proposing that the TsURKP [?] enact the following specific measures:

1) All the directives that I proposed in the last report, the need for which has been confirmed by my trip around Semirechie.

2) To devote attention to the growing ethnic animosity and conduct a more class-oriented policy, primarily in terms of an international association of the poor.

3) To under no circumstances conduct the policy of correcting the wrongs and injustices done to the Kirgiz during years of rebellion and hunger with an eye toward vengeance for the past and not to take things to the absurd point, for example of taking away from the Dungan and Sa...s their Kirgiz wives or returning those wives to their natives auls (Fact 1).

4) To give untilled farmland and remaining unoccupied houses of evicted Russians temporarily, until the evictees are provided for (land for...sowing, and apartments only for the winter), to those in need based on the severity of their need (many are still living out in the open) without regard to ethnicity.

5) To under no circumstances confiscate inventory from the Kirgiz poor and return it to its former owner: unprofitable gardens can be returned to their form owners so long as the size of the garden corresponds to land allotment norms.

6) To continue the land utilization reform, taking into account not just political considerations, but economic expediency as well.

For which:

а) No later than...spring, to inventory water

<<l.13>> 

and land in Semirechie.

b) To not vacate even those settlements intended for resettlement or elimination until all evictees are found new places.

c) To not maintain illusions that all members of the union of Kirgiz poor and batraks will be immediately settled on land; settle on land only those who are economically prepared, in other words outfitted artels, and to give the rest government jobs wherever possible.

d) To maintain constant managerial oversight over artels, to which end a cadre of good instructors should be created, and, where possible, connect productive artels (smiths, carpenters, plasterers, etc.) with agricultural artels so that...would service...

e) To urgently conduct irrigation work in order to rapidly expand the supply of land.

f) Using "white coal," which is abundant in Semirechie, devote attention to electrifying the area, tying this to irrigation work (now...a small electrified area--from the Chui works--that even provides power to Kirgiz yurts). 

Some of these proposals require help from Moscow. First, exceptionally important work having to do with...must...(220,000 desiatinas), but will be completed without Moscow's particular attention to this matter. It is terribly important for this work to be completed, and I ask that serious attention be devoted to this. Second, Semirechie's land and water will never be inventoried through their own effort. In order to manage this before spring (and that is crucial!), up to 200 land surveyors, land engineers, etc., should be sent here. Now, we don't have such large works here, and I think that Russia would be able to mobilize and send here that many.

<<l.14>>

In conclusion, two more questions.

1) Two major jobs are being carried out here: completion of the Semirechie Railway and the irrigation of the river valley by...in accordance with Gosplan there has to be a decision on which of these works to continue, and in my opinion priority should be given to irrigation works. 

3) After suppression of the Kirgiz rebellion and...time of famine, the Kirgiz masses left for China. Many have returned, but many more have not been able to, since they have been enslaved in Kulja [Yining, China]. Their owners sell these slaves among themselves. They lose them at dice, and even separate... and so forth. The situation is barbarous and nightmarish. The Kirgiz asked me about...manufactured goods, since our money isn't worth much in Kulja, and these slaves can have their freedom bought for manufactured goods. But I replied that Russia does not recognize human trafficking and therefore will not buy anyone's freedom, and instead demands that the Chinese government put a stop to slavery and return all of the Kirgiz poor.

I think that our policy should be rather flexible, so that, for example, while focusing on the Near East, on Kemalist Turkey, we nevertheless shouldn't put the Armenians at their mercy,and while focusing on the Far East and China we shouldn't let the Chinese bourgeoisie and aristocracy traffic in Russian citizens. I would therefore insist on sending to Peking by radio a careful but rather firm note demanding that they put a stop to the barbarity described above. This note should be widely distributed among the Kirgiz, since this will make a huge impression. If the note is appropriately written, it should make a good impression on the Chinese masses as well, who, after all, also are often slaves.

Finally, I feel that we cannot stop at a note, but must actually achieve the liberation of the Kirgiz slaves.

After implementing the Semirechie decisions here, I will leave for Bukhara (21 Oct.). If it is possible to travel by water, I will go from there to Khiva. If not, I will set aside that trip and summon Cde. Byk to Bukhara, since I am again quite ill and a trip

<<l.15>>

along the roads here by horse is beyond my strength. I will then spend time in the Transcaspian area, since the Turkmen question is important there and I am yet to familiarize myself with it.

Communist regards,

A. Ioffe

...

16 Oct 1921

<<l.16>>

<<Illegible>>